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Abstract
The American population is getting older, and with the aging of the population the
prevalence of chronic illnesses will increase. Current social policies that are intended to
assist elderly persons and their families in case of illness are no longer sufficient to meet
that need, and will decline further as the number of older persons increases. This is
especially true for patients who have developed dementia, including Alzheimer's disease,
because dementias are still considered that "peculiar disease of the cerebral cortex"
described by Alois Alzheimer in 1907 that seems not to fit any current classification.
This study was designed to explore how the classification of dementia has
influenced the social policies that govern a variety of institutions and systems, and the
ultimate outcome for the provision of care for dementia patients and their care givers. Its
purpose is to describe the current reality faced by dementia patients and their families.
The focus of the study was an exploration of written policies, rules, and
regulations that govern existing systems, and how such written rules affect the patients
based on the classification of their disorder. After an exploration of written material and
description of the resulting services, interviews were conducted to complement the
previously mentioned material with the experiences of those who are charged with the
delivery of care based on such rules.
The findings from this study lend support to the following conclusions: l) the
classification of dementias as mental illness can lead to involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization or reduced reimbursement if treated on an outpatient basis; 2) the
classification as deterioration with aging that requires support only results in lack of

formal support outside of institutionalization and almost no reimbursement by Medicare or
Medicaid for treatment and care in home setting; 3) the seldom used classification as a
physical illness allows for most but still insufficient support. All classifications frequently
lead to the impoverishment of the patient which in turn often leads to institutionalization.
It is concluded from this study that the classification and the social policies based
on such classification have become dysfunctional for the original population of older and
ill persons and their families, but have become functional for new industries, professions,
and bureaucracies. Further studies should investigate how the policies can again become
functional for the intended population, and whether re-evaluation of the classification for
dementia can be a first step in that direction.
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Chapter 1 - Introduction
The American population is growing older, and many people age without
significant health or economic problems. However, a proportion of the aging population
will develop one or more chronic illnesses, some that are considered physical and others
that are considered psychological. It is the segment of the chronically ill that will be
discussed, specifically those elderly persons who develop dementia, especially of the
Alzheimer's type. It is the purpose of this study to explore how the classification of
dementia has influenced social policies that govern a variety of institutions and systems,
and the ultimate outcome for the provision of care for dementia patients and their care
givers.
Obviously, people have always aged, some of the aged needed assistance, and
families and communities had to find ways to provide that assistance. However, the
introduction of Medicare and Medicaid in the mid 1960s, as well as the entry of a large
number of women into the workforce, may have forever changed how elder care is
provided in our society. Furthermore, never before in American history did people have a
life expectancy as long as they have now, and never before in American histo1y were the
elderly the fastest growing segment of our population, a trend termed "the graying of
America."
The Effects of the Graying of America on National Financial Resources
The postwar period of the 1950s was marked by unbound optimism in the future
(Holstein, 1993). One indication of this optimism was the increased birthrate in the
country during that period, resulting in the "baby boom" generation. While the birthrate

during the Depression of the 1930s was at 75.8 births per 1,000 women of childbearing
age, during the 1950s it soared to 122.7 births, and began to drop in the 1960s until it had
declined to 67.0 births in 1990 (Popenoe, 1993). At the same time, life expectancy was
increasing continuously. Obviously, high birthrates and low mortality will result in an older
population. Table 1 demonstrates this trend from 1970 to the year 2050.
Table 1 - Population by Age 1970 - 2050
.
.
CIll thousan ds )*1993 - 2050 pro1ected(ill!'ddle senes)
Year

Total

65-74 years

75-84 years

85 years

1970

203,235 (100%)

12,443 (6.1%)

6,122 (3.0%)

1,408 (0.7%)

1980

226,546 ( I 00%)

15,581 (6.9%)

7,729 (3.4%)

2,240 (1.0%)

1990

248,710 (100%)

18,045 (7.3%)

10,012 (4.0%)

3,021 (1.2%)

1993*

257,927 (100%)

18,650 (7.2%)

10,628 (4.1%)

3.315(1.3%)

2010*

300,431(100%)

20,978 (7.0%)

13,157 (4.4%)

5,969 (2.0%)

2030*

349,993 (100%)

37,429 (10.9%)

23,348 (6.7%)

8,843 (2.5%)

392,031(100%)
26,588 (6.8%)
2050*
34,628 (8.8%)
18,893 (4.8%)
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Rcp01is, p. 25-1104

Evidently, the aging population is occupying an ever increasing percentage of the
total population. The cohort of Americans aged 65-74 increased from 6.1% in 1970 to
7.3% in 1990, and is expected to represent 8.8% of the population by the year 2050. For
the cohort 75-84, the increase was from 3% in 1970 to 4% in 1990, and is projected to be
6.8% by 2050. For the 85 and over cohort, the increase is from 0. 7% in 1970 to 1.2% in
1990 to projected 4.8% in the year 2050. This means that the first group may increase by
2. 7%, the second by 3.8%, and the oldest group by 4.1% over a period of 80 years.
The fastest growing cohort, age 85 and over, is the group with the highest
prevalence of chronic illness, including dementia. Currently, only I% of people in the age
group from under 65 to 74 years are diagnosed with severe dementia. This increases to
2

7% for the group age 75 - 84, and to 25% for those over 85 years (Coleman, 1994).
According to data released by the Alzheimer's Association (1992), approximately four
million Americans have Alzheimer's disease and, unless a cure is found, more than 14
million Americans will be afflicted by the middle of the next century. Alzheimer's disease
is the most common type of senile dementia, representing over half of all dementia cases
(Alzheimer's Association, 1992). The pathologic changes in the brain, while less marked
in other senile dementias than in Alzheimer's disease, are identical and thus, "the
distinction between senile dementia and Alzheimer's disease is ... arbitrary" (Guenther,
1983). Since Alzheimer's disease is a type of senile dementia, the terms dementia and
Alzheimer's disease will be used interchangeably throughout this study.
Today, Alzheimer's disease costs society approximately $90 billion a year. This
means that the cost for the year 2050 could be estimated at $3 15 billion excluding any
increase in health care cost. A report by the Alzheimer's Association ( l 994) states, "A
new repo11 that Alzheimer's disease will cost this country $1.75 trillion is further evidence
that this disorder is an urgent public health issue requiring immediate attention ...
Alzheimer's disease is draining the resources of this country, and its citizens, at a great
rate" (1). Even if we assume that the cost estimated by the Alzheimer's Association, an
advocacy group, is on the high side, cost for dementia care may become tremendous when
we consider the following expenditures. The national health care expenditures for 1991
were 13.2% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with $751.8 billion. Compared to the
1960 expenditures of $27 .1 billion (5 .3% of the GDP), this represents an increase of 7.9%
and $724. 7 billion over the last thirty-one years. Considering the rate of health care cost
3

increases from l 960 to l 99 l, together with the population and dementia prevalence
projections, proactive policies are absolutely necessary. Summarizing the impact
Alzheimer's disease will have not only on fiscal resources, but on all aspects of society,
Scinto (1995) writes: "Today Alzheimer's disease is poised to become the plague of the
next century" (2).
Dementia: A Topic for Sociological Investigation
It appears that the study of health care issues related to aging should be the arena
of health care professionals and fiscal and insurance policy makers, not of sociologists.
Some sociologists, including Habermas and Foucault, warn against sociologists becoming
social engineers or providing the blueprints for social engineering. However, Farganis
( 1993) illustrates how sociology can investigate a topic without getting involved in social
engineering. He writes, "For Weber, scientific analysis was a tool for understanding social
reality and not an appropriate instrument for social change" ( I 07). 1:.urthermore, as
Sudnow ( 196 7) noted when studying dying, biological events such as dying or illness
occur within a social context and have social consequences; thus they are an appropriate
topic for sociological investigation. It is the role of sociology, and was the intent of this
study, to increase the understanding of social reality, that is, what factors are contributing
to the dilemma society is facing in providing adequate support for dementia victims and
their families.
Obviously, the issues of an aging population and how to provide adequate health
care for that population are complex. When analyzing how dementia care is provided and
paid for, it becomes apparent that care and payment for such care by the main insurance

4

J

l

carriers for senior citizens, Medicare and Medicaid, is related to how the disease is
classified. Classification is explored in greater detail in the following chapters. Some
consider dementia a mental illness, others see it as a physical illness, and yet other perceive
dementia as a human state of deterioration requiring custodial care only. Depending on
how dementia is classified, different systems may be accessed to assist the dementia
patients and their families. Consequently, different sociological concepts may be useful in
understanding society's dilemma when dealing with dementia. The concepts of deviance,
labeling, function and dysfunction, and bureaucracies were utilized as they apply to the
different concepts and systems.
Method of Investigation
To explore how the classification of dementia influences social policy and
outcome, a variety of research methods were used. The study was mainly exploratory with
some descriptive components. The units of analysis were the various institutions and
systems, with a focus on their policies, that provide services to patients and their families.
This included the mental health system and the legal system as it relates to the mental
health system, the nursing home, adult residence, and home health industries, social
service and social security agencies as well as private insurance carriers and primary health
care providers.
According to Babbie ( 1992), exploratory studies are useful to determine whether a
more careful study of the topic is feasible and what methods should be employed in a more
extensive study. Answers from an exploratory study also "suggest ways in which ...
complexities could be tapped in a more structured questionnaire to be administered to a
5

much larger sample" (91 ). Therefore, before exploring detailed components and utilizing a
larger and more representative sample of persons involved in dementia care, the current
study explored what systems are in place, why they are in place, and how the classification
of dementia influences their function.
As a first step, secondary sources in form of a literature search were used to
determine how and why certain systems have developed and whether classification plays a
role in these systems. Because of the various systems and their respective jurisdiction,
natural and social science literature were used such as medicine and nursing, and
respectively, sociology, psychology, gerontology, and social work. Additionally, the legal
literature and material from advocacy groups were used, together with material from
government sources and the health care industry. Special attention was paid to the
exploration of policies governing Medicare and Medicaid, the main sources of payment for
health care of dementia patients. The focus of the search was a) on antecedents for present
policies and systems and b) whether those policies are still useful or functional for the
intended target population.
Although policies and regulations do exist, often times there is a gap between the
ideal and the real. Therefore, to understand the real world of care, unstructured direct and
telephone interviews were conducted with key staff from various agencies. Key staff are
those that are responsible for development of policies or that have major responsibility for
implementation of these policies. Typically they are in administrative/managerial roles, and
they usually have the best understanding of their organization's policies, regulations, and
programs. In addition, some field staff were interviewed to explore whether written
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policies and implementations are consistent with each other, and how
well these policies
and practices fulfill their purpose for dementia victims and their formal or

informal care

givers. Field staff are those who work directly with either the patient or the care

giver and

are typically social workers, nurses, or others in service providing roles, including
physicians. The field research method is appropriate for the interviews because "field
research can reveal things that would not otherwise be apparent" (Babbie, 1992, p.
286),
thus validity of qualitative field research is usually superior to that of quantitative metho
ds.
The unstructured interview, according to Lofland and Lofland (1995), is "a guide
d
conversation whose goal it is to elicit from the interviewee ... rich, detailed materials that
can be used in qualitative analysis" (18). The investigator in this study worked for
approximately twelve years in the field of gerontology and has developed good rapport
with key staff and field workers in various organizations. While not a full participant in
most organizations, she was a partial participant-as-observer, and in one organization, the
mental hospital that will be explored, a full participant-as-observer. Loflan d and Lofland
(1995) suggest that the researcher should not be overly concerned with the contamination
of data due to the closeness of the participant-as-observer to the study topic and the unit
of analysis. However, they find a tension between "distance and closeness in the
researcher" beneficial to the richness of data. The researcher in this study was not directly
involved in patient care services, yet was close enough to the systems to gather honest
data from the interviewees. Of course, this raises some ethical concerns. But before
discussing the ethical concerns, some shortcomings of the exploratory field research must
be addressed.
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Field research in the form of interviews is usually less objective than quantitative
methods. The interpretation of the material is subject to the researcher's position on a
topic, especially when the information provided is reported in a descriptive manner. A
comparative analysis, when possible, will increase reliability (Babbie, 1992). Replication,
while increasing reliability, is usually difficult since the interview will be largely
unstructured, and thus the interaction between the researcher and the informant may not
be replicable.
Obviously, the problem with reliability also leads to a problem with generalizability
of the collected data. While field research may give the investigator a more in-depth
understanding of the research topic, the sampling techniques required to generalize data
are usually not met (Babbie, 1992). A generalizability problem specific to this study is the
unit of analysis. The organizations studied are state agencies of the Commonwealth of
Virginia or organizations that are regulated by the state as, for instance, the nursing and
adult homes. While the issues in all states are somewhat similar, they are still ditforent
enough to prevent generalization. A comparative analysis of the policies and programs of
all fitly states, as it was recently conducted (and federally funded) in the field of elder
abuse, may be necessary but was beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, as
previously discussed, this is an exploratory study and the results may be useful in the
development of more in-depth studies that can employ methods better suited to meet more
rigorous reliability and generalizability requirements.
Ethical Considerations
Finally, ethical considerations must be addressed. It is necessary that no harm,
8

either physically, psychologically, or socially will result from a study
for those who
participate in it. While physical danger was very unlikely to participants in this
study, job
security could have become an issue for an informant. Therefore, anonymity and
confidentiality, as well as voluntary participation in the study, were essential. All
interviewees were notified of the intent of the conversation with the assurance that
their
identity would not be revealed in reporting data or for any other purposes, unless they
agreed to have their names disclosed. In addition to protecting the interviewees, this
practice also increased the likelihood that they were revealing issues beyond the officia
l
policies.
An additional ethical consideration specific to this study was the possible effect of
the results on dementia victims and their families. As previously mentioned, this study
attempted to increase the understanding of social reality, that is, whether the classification
of dementia is contributing to the dilemma of providing adequate support for dementia
victims and their families. While improvement in the provision of services is always
desirable, further intensive studies should be the basis for social policy and prog rammatic
changes. This exploratory study should only be a first step and was by no means intended
to provide a blueprint for social change.
Organization of the Project
With this introductory chapter having defined the research topic, its relevance to
society, why it should be investigated from a sociological perspective, and methods and
ethical considerations, the foUowing chapters will present the findings and conclusions.
As a basis for better understanding dementia, chapter two will explore common
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definitions and classifications of dementia, and then describe what dementia of the
Alzheimer's type is, based on current knowledge. It will also cover how dementia patients
enter the treatment and care system, and how the classification of their disorder will affect
the consequent course of care.
Chapters three and four will explore the treatment and care system available to the
patients and their families. The discussion in chapter three will cover the role of
institutional inpatient psychiatric care when dementia is classified as a mental illness. This
will include the involuntary commitment process. The focus in chapter four will be on the
consequences when dementia is not classified as a mental illness. Institutionalized care for
patients in non-mental health settings such as nursing homes and adult care residences will
be discussed, and care in a private home together with community options for the patients
and home care providers.
Chapter six will explore how payment for treatment and care is based on
classification, thus how social policies governing payment are driven by classification.
Also, the function and dysfunction of social policies and of classification will be discussed.
The advantages and disadvantages of bureaucracies to administer policy-driven systems
will conclude that chapter.
With the previous chapters having covered the treatment and care options and the
payment for treatment and care, chapter six will attempt to show how societal values may
influence these topics and the ethical dilemma they present. To explore some alternatives,
a brief discussion will be given of the social policies some other countries have
implemented to address the problem of caring for the chronically ill, with a special focus
10

on the German model. The conclusion of that final chapter is intended to encourage a re
evaluation of our present thinking about the classification of dementia based on current
knowledge.
It is hoped that the research will increase awareness of the difficulties facing
dementia patients, their care givers, and society, and how classification may have
contributed to care in systems that are not be in the best interest of the elderly population
and their families. Furthermore, it is hoped that a comprehensive understanding of the
present reality and how it developed will lead to future research into better methods to
generate social policy that fulfills the needs of the individual patient, the care givers, and
society within the constraints of dwindling resources for health care.
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Chapter 2 - Definition and Classification
To provide a basis to better understand why the definition and classification
dementia is problematic, this chapter will explore how dementia is defined and

of

classified'

and what dementia actually is, based on current knowledge. Furthermore, how
classification influences the entrance of the patient into various health care or custo
dial
settings, and how the setting entered may influence the patient's future care, will be
discussed.
The definition and classification of dementia varies with disciplines. The linguistic,
legal and general medical definition and the psychiatric classification will be explored.
Definitions
Linguistically, the term "dementia" is derived from dement. Dement is defined in
the Oxford English Dictionary (1971) as"... out of one's mind." The American Heri tage
Dictionary, Second College Edition, ( 1982) gives a more precise definition as follows:
"Dementia ... 1. Irreversible deterioration of intellectual faculties with accompanying
emotional disturbance, resulting from organic brain disorder ... " and"Dement ... [Llat.
dementare, Lat. demense, mad: de-, from+ mense, mind]."
Black's Law Dictionary - 1st edition, published in 1891, gives the following legal
definition of dementia: "Senile Dementia - That particular decay of the mental faculties
which occurs in extreme old age, and in many cases much earlier, whereby the person is
reduced to second childhood, and becomes sometimes wholly incompetent to enter into
any binding contract, or even to execute a will. It is the recurrence of second childhood by
,,
mere decay. The 6th edition, published in I 990, separates the terms senile and dementia,
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thus offering the following two definitions: "Dementia: Form of mental disorder in which
cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; impairment of
memory is early sign; total recovery is not possible since organic cerebral disease is
involved."
"Senile: Quality of being senile; an infirmity resulting from deterioration of mind
and body experienced in old age. Feebleness of body and mind incident to old age; and an
incapacity to contract arising from the impairment of the intellectual faculties by old age."
A medical definition is provided by the Stedman's Medical Dictionary (1989) in
the chapter on neurological [italics added] disorders as follows: "Dementia [L. Fr. De
priv. + mens, mind] ... a general mental deterioration due to organic or psychological
factors; characterized by disorientation, impaired memory, judgement, and intellect, and a
shallow labile affect." Harpers Collins Medical dictionary ( 1993) offers: "Dementia
Deterioration of intellectual function due to organic factors; formerly used to denote
madness or insanity."
When analyzing the three types of definitions, some inconsistencies become
apparent, especially in the impression the definitions create. The first linguistic definition is
the most neutral one; it makes no medical claim. "Out of one's mind" is the most widely
accepted translation, but as can be seen later, the term was originally applied to a different
illness: to Schizophrenia. The definition does not give the reader a clue that the meaning of
the definition has changed. The second linguistic definition is also misleading. Not all
illnesses termed dementia or that present with dementia symptoms are irreversible.
Medication problems, metabolic disorders, nutritional deficiencies, trauma, delirium, or
13

depression, to name just a few, also can create dementia type illnesses, yet they are
reversible if detected early. Nevertheless, the impression, even in part of the medical
community, that dementia is irreversible and a "normal" process occurring with aging
deprives many patients of appropriate diagnosis and treatment, medically and socially
(Hirsh, 1990; Scinto, 1995). It is noteworthy that the second definition attributes dementia
to organic brain disorder.
The latter legal definition also attributes dementia to organic disorder, but clearly
labels it as mental disorder. While the language in the sixth edition is less reductionistic
than in the first edition, it still allows some inferences why the legal system is involved
with several aspects in a dementia patient's life, but mainly with treatment decision when a
patient is entering the mental health system on an involuntary basis. Considering the early
definition, together with the longstanding historical involvement of the legal system with
mentally ill persons, the paternalistic approach to the "disposal" of dementia patients
becomes more understandable. Additionally, the definition seems to suggest that patients
with senile dementia are incapable to contract from the moment of diagnosis and are not
able to make any binding decisions for themselves. However, such incapacity is only true
for later stages of the disease, but the impression of early incapacity is common and can
lead to decisions that may not be in the best interest of the patient.
The medical definitions do not use the term "irreversible," but attribute the disease
to organic deterioration. The Stedman definition offers a possible psyc hological
explanation, which may be applicable to, for instance, depressions that present with
dementia symptoms. It is noteworthy that the Harpers definition clearly states that
14

dementia was "formerly used to denote madness or insanity."
Obviously, depending on the source of the definition, different impressions can
arise regarding reversibility, and whether dementia is a physical or mental illness. As will
be shown, true dementias such as Alzheimer's disease are irreversible and have a
somewhat predictable course. However, whether the disease is to be classified as a
physical or mental illness, or perhaps just aging, is not clear yet, but has considerable
impact on the patient, the family, and the care that is available.
Classification
The term "dementia" appears in the first attempt to classify psychiatric illnesses.
Emil Kraepelin, who published the first true classification system in 1883, identified two
mental diseases: dementia praecox [early], now termed schizophrenia, and manic
depressive psychosis (Davison & Neal, 1990). Old-age or senile dementia is not
mentioned. However, it is notable that Alois Alzheimer, the German neurologist who
described for the first time in 1907 the neuropathology of the brain named afte r him as
Alzheimer's disease, was a colleague of Kraepelin (Chenitz, Stone and Salisbury' 199 l ,·
Meyer, 1994). As previously discussed, Alzheimer's disease is the most common type of
dementia as the term is used today.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA), in the latest edition of the

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorder, the DSM-IV, clearly includes
dementia as a mental illness. Dementias, among other disorders, are classified among those
disorders that are known to be caused by brain impairment, either permanent or transient.
According to Laura Queeny from the APA (personal communication, April 1995), the first
15
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treatment. Cardiovascular disease has an effect on patients' behavior. Their activity level
may be greatly impaired, they may have limitations on their life style, and their social life
may change.
Although the biological processes may be similar for both diseases, the behavioral
outcome with dementia patients whose brain is affected is different. When the cardiac
patient grabs his chest in agony during angina pain or a heart attack, it is understandable
and measures to assist the patient are usually known. Alzheimer's disease patients, on the
other hand, may display behaviors that are both incomprehensible and frightening. They
may become aggressive, so forgetful that they do not recognize loved ones or their own
image in a mirror, and may even forget how to bathe, groom, dress, and even eat.
Sometimes in the process they become paranoid, delusional, or otherwise psychotic.
Considering that as the disease progresses every moment in the patient's life is a new
experience, responses such as paranoia, aggression, and psychosis are not surprising.
However, as a psychiatrist pointedly stated: "If they [the patients] just wouldn't behave so
strange, they wouldn't bother anyone." And the private insurance spokesperson said:
"Frankly, between us ... they frighten us, that's why we can't deal with it."
Mental illness is a social and psychological construct. It cannot be measured by
blood tests, seen on x-rays, or felt during manual examination. While definite testing for
Alzheimer's disease is currently only feasible after death, medical advances allow us to test
for the disease with some accuracy. With Computer-Assisted Tomography (CAT scan)
changes can be detected in the later stages of the disease, especially atrophied (shrunken)
brain with tissue indentations and enlarged fluid-filled chambers. Newer types of
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equipment such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET scan), Single Photon Emission
Computerized Tomography (SPECT), as well as Magnetic-Resonance Imaging (MRI),
can show changes in the brain of a patient with possible Alzheimer's disease relatively
early in the disease process. The National Institute of Neurological and Communicative
Disorders and Stroke-Alzheimer's Disease and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS
ADRDA) work group has developed criteria for a diagnostic workup that includes
neuroimaging and other neurological and psycho-neurological testing. Other tests that can
detect physical changes and that may assist in accurately diagnosing dementias are
developed rapidly. For instance, experiments using eye drops that result in a different
reaction in Alzheimer's patients than in non-patients have shown promising results in
laboratory tests (National Institutes of Health, 1994).
Even though some (Cutler, 1993) still may consider Alzheimer's disease a
"normal" part of aging, that notion is put to rest by current scientific knowledge. For
instance, a pamphlet of the National Institutes for Health (NIH, 1994) states: "Alzheimer's
disease is the term used to describe a dementing disorder marked by certain brain changes
... is not a normal part of aging--it is not something that inevitably happens in later life"
but, "the main risk factor for Alzheimer's disease is increased age" ( l ). So Alzheimer's
disease is not normal aging, and Alzheimer's disease does not fit cleanly into the mental
illness category. It appears that the physical illness category allows for a better fit. Perhaps
the director of an aging association put it best: "It's age related, but it is not normal aging,
it's a quasi mental illness with a foot in each compar1ment ... the causes are physical but
the treatment is mental" (personal communication, September 1995).
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Although, it seems that the physical nature of the illness is accepted by most,
treatment does not reflect such medical explanation. Except for some pharmaceutical
interventions, treatment is usually supportive or custodial, and in the best instances
behavioral/supportive. But even though we can presently not cure or reverse Alzheimer's
disease, we can alleviate symptoms and suffering (NIH, 1994). According to Thelma
Bland, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department for the Aging, the most important
way to accomplish that task is family education and support (personal communication,
September 1995). Since families are usually not medical professionals, such statements
remove dementia from the medical realm and place it in the custodial area, often times in
one where care and "treatment" are provided by family members without financial
compensation.
Nevertheless, regardless whether dementia is categorized as a biological or mental
illness, there is agreement among general medicine, neurology, and psychiatry about the
outcome of the illness. Guenther (J 983) writes "Only nonspecific supportive therapy is
available. The patient usually dies 5 to l O years after the onset of illness, usually from
respiratory infections" (515). Others allow 6 to 8 years, or in some instances as little as 2
years or as much as 20 years from onset of the illness to death (NIH, 1994). But what
happens to the patient and his or her family from the beginning of the disease until death is
greatly influenced by a) classification of the disease and b) social policy that is driven'
among other things, by the classification.
Clinical Features of Dementia
Before exploring the treatment and care options available to the patients within
20

the

current social policy climate, the course of Alzheimer's disease will be briefly covered.
The course is often described in stages; some use four stages, others use seven, and yet
others use up to ten stages. In every phase, symptoms are not unique to Alzheimer's
disease, so it is imp01iant that other diseases that are often less serious, and more
importantly usually reversible, are ruled out.
The onset of Alzheimer's disease is usually gradual. The first signs noticed may be
memory problems, especially problems with short term memory. A patient may repeatedly
forget to turn off a stove or forget to take medicine. As the disease progresses, abstract
thinking and intellectual functioning will become impaired. Recently performed tasks such
as balancing a check book or organizing daily activities may become increasingly difficult
for the patient. The patient may also become initable and neglect self care. Still later in the
disease process, confusion and disorientation are common. The patient may forget time
and place, may wander away from home, and become lost. Familiar objects and persons
become unfamiliar and conversation becomes less and less possible as language and
cognitive skills deteriorate. The patient may become even more inattentive, have erratic
mood swings, and lose bladder and bowl control. In the very late stages, the patient
becomes completely incapacitated, sometimes even unable to swallow food and may live
in a near vegetative state until death. Rate and severity of decline vary with each patient.
Some patients function at an acceptable level for a long time and need only some
assistance while others may need much assistance early on. While the functioning levels of
patients may vary widely, patients are still in need of interpersonal relationships, of loving,
and caring (NIH, 1994). They also still have a right to as much self-determination as
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possible and being treated with dignity. How much self-determination a patient can
maintain is linked to the time when the problems are brought to the attention of someone
in the systems that will be involved with the patient, mainly the various health care systems
and the legal system.
Entering the Systems
Early memory problems are frequently attributed to the normal aging process and
will be ignored. Frequently, people jokingly will say: "I'm getting old and forgetful," or "I
must be getting Alzheimer's disease," or more frequently "Old-timer's disease." Old
timer's sometimes is linked to difficulties in the pronunciation of the German word
Alzheimer's, but more frequently to a general acceptance that old-timers become forgetful
and somewhat "senile." Using such serious illness in a joking manner is an indicator that
general education about the disease is far behind that of other diseases. No one would, say,
"[ must have ArDS," because most people know what a serious disease AlDS is. Yet,
Alzheimer's disease is not any less serious and has a similar outcome. Even medical
professionals may attribute forgetfulness to the normal aging process. A senior case
manager in a community mental health clinic found it to be her experience that "general
practitioners may try medications when older persons come in confused, but most of them
don't get tests, most doctors assume that's how it is when people get old" (personal
communication, September 1995). However, as physicians become more educated about
dementing illnesses or those that appear like dementing illnesses, more accurate and early
diagnosis can be expected, with consequent better treatment (Hirsh, 1990).
Later stages bring a patient more likely into contact with a system. The first
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Chapter 3 - Dementia as a Mental Illness
As previously discussed, dementia is included in the classifi
cation

of mental

disorders. Therefore, psychiatric treatment for dementia patients,
including inpatient care
'

is one of the options for patients and their families. In this chapter the
long-standing

difficulties of society to deal with the concept of mental illness will be explor
ed. This will
be followed by an analysis of admission procedures for psychiatric inpatient
care,
how America has arrived at the current standards for admission to psychiatric

including

facilities and

the involvement of the legal system to involuntary commit patients. Finally, the
safeguards
that are supposed to protect patients from inappropriate involuntary admission to
psychiatric facilities will be examined as they apply to dementia patients.
Schulz (1985) quotes Butler who wrote in 1975, "The tragedy of old age is not the
fact that each of us must grow old and die but that the process of doing so has been made
unnecessarily and at times excr uciatingly painful, humiliating, debilitating and
isolating"(l92-l93). An example of that tragedy may be a dementia patient who is
displaying difficult behavior, and is for that reason detained by police, handcutfod, and
delivered to a community mental health clinic or a mental hospital to be incarcerated. Suc h
a person may never have had any involvement with the police or the legal system. The
only offense committed is not meeting any longer the expectations of society because one

is growing old and has the bad fo1iune of having a brain that is deteriorating from disease.
The second bad fortune is that we still classify dementia as a mental illness; thus the legal
system through the civil commitment process can be invoked to commit a person with or
without consent to a mental hospital. All it takes is that we deem the person's behavior
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1990, p. 557).
Similar thinking was expressed by Scheff in 1966 who applied Becker's labeling
theory to the concept of mental illness. According to this theory
deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a
consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an
"offender." The deviant is one to whom the label has been successfully
applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label. (Becker, I 963, p.
9, cited in Holstein, 1993).
Scheff appears to make the argument that mental illness has social not medical
reasons, and consequently, the societal reaction not the pathological states of an individual
must be studied.
Obviously, such revolutionary thinking did not go unchallenged. Gove, in a
rebuttal, argued that it was not societal reaction but a person's psychiatric condition and
behavior that were important in determining whether one was identified and treated as
mentally ill. An ongoing heated and public exchange between Scheff and Gove dominated
the major sociological publications for well over a decade in the 1970s and 1980s
(Holstein, 1993).
Gove's view is in line with the previously discussed opinion of the admission
director of a psychiatric facility. However, other clinicians in the same facility believe that
too many patients are admitted for social problems. This seems to support the argument of
Scheff and Szasz, that is, the label of mental illness is affixed to misbehavior and social
problems, not to brain disease.
Obviously, dementia is a brain disease. Following the arguments of Szasz and
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those with out-of-norm behavior was already well established, and confinement required a
reason such as mental illness. Furthermore, older dementia patients, based on relatively
short life expectancies, were still too few to be concerned with. Additionally, yet another
view was emerging with the neurologist, Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), who is by many
considered the founder of modern abnormal psychology. Freud removed the domain of
mental disorders from general medicine and neurology into psychology and psychiatry--a
course followed for many years. (Abbott, 1988, in The System of Professions gives a
thorough account of the processes involved in the division of jurisdictions among different
professions.) Senile dementia, recognized as a brain deterioration, and thus clearly a
physical illness but with mental symptoms, simply was left in the domain of mental
disorders, perhaps for a lack of a more appropriate place. Also, the mental hospital
industry was growing in Europe as well as in America, so there was a place for these
patients, and a cure was not yet in sight.
Then as now it is this classification of dementia as a mental illness that allows the
involuntary commitment of some older people through the legal system. The next segment
will explore the historical and current role of the legal system in committing patients to
treatment.
Treatment of the Mentally 111 in Hospitals
Not only did different periods attach different labels to behaviors that are beyond
the general understanding, the label also affected the treatment of those considered
deviant. During periods when out-of-norm behavior was attributed to the supernatural, the
clergy of the respective institution was in charge of treatment. However, with the loss of
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institutions. Additionally, the

development of powerful antipsychotic drugs in the 1950s allowed persons who could
previously only be managed in an institutional setting to live in the community (Romano,
1994). Also, state mental health budgets were reduced, thus states had additional
incentives to move the mentally ill out of state hospitals. Bonnie (1993) believes that "de
institutionalization would have occurred even without the libertarian developments" (3)
that prompted the mental health laws; the time was simply ripe for it. However, the de
institutionalization movement of the last three decades resulted in other problems. The
mental hospitals either no longer committed the mentally ill or "dumped" them into the
community because they no longer met commitment criteria. For instance, in the 1950s
state mental hospitals had almost half a million patients; this population had dropped to
about 130,000 by the late l 980s. However, community programs could not keep pace
with the onslaught of mentally ill persons because, according to Davison & Neal ( 1990),
"There is not an unlimited supply of money, and care of the mentally ill has never been one
of government's high priorities" (618). The mentally ill once again became visible to
society in the form of the homeless and in reports of deplorable conditions in nursing
homes and boarding houses. They also entered the legal system, the very same system that
set out to protect them with civil commitment laws, but this time they entered the system
under criminal law. Society had returned to the "criminalization of mental illness."
The current trend to deal with the problem is toward increased institutionalization
or incarceration of deviants (Lafond & Durham, 1992; Wexler, 1981). However, as a
society we still seem to have reservations about the state's paternalistic power. Stuart Mill
(cited in Wexler, 1981) suggested that "society ought to interfere with an individual
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against his or her will only to protect others, not to protect the individual personally" (39).
This suggestion would preclude anyone not presenting an imminent danger to others from
interference by the legal system and possible commitment to a mental hospital. The
underlying assumption is that the state may not know what is best for an individual and
that the individual's dignity may be offended by the state's interference. These
considerations should weigh heavy when elderly persons, diagnosed with dementia-type
illnesses, are considered for placement in mental hospitals.
Interaction Between Legal and Mental Health Systems
As shown previously, the various legal systems have long been invoked to confine
those who display unacceptable behavior that is attributed to mental disorders. However,
societies used different standards to determine the presence of mental disorder, and one
can suspect that mental disorder was ollen used to incarcerate those who were
uncomfortable to those in power. The implementations of the Mental Health laws in
America in the 1970s, and consequent limitations on civil commitments are considered a
safeguard against such abuse. A diagnosis of mental illness is a pre-condition tor any civil
commitment, or as Holstein ( 1993) writes, "Mental illness provides a rationale for
depriving persons of their freedom in order to promote their well-being" (3).
Invoking the Legal System
Today involuntary commitment is based on civil law which has its theoretical basis
in the criminal justice system. The modern criminal justice system is a combination of
Beccaria's free will theory, and Ferri's deterministic crime theory. According to Wexler
( 1981 ), classical criminology is "a blending of Kantian retributive justice and the
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utilitarianism of Cesare di Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham" (11) which proposes that
persons have a free will and, therefore, should be held accountable for their actions.
However, classical criminology was criticized as overlooking differences between
individual offenders such as biological, environmental, and psychological factors.
Consequently others, including Enrico Ferri, proposed a deterministic criminology that
advanced the abolition of personal responsibility and moral guilt as a basis for criminal
law. He writes:
When an individual has been found to have committed an act harmful to
society, the law should not be concerned with questions of guilt and its
degrees nor with measuring a fit punishment, but should humanely [italics
added] apply whatever measures are necessary to protect society from
further transgressions by the same individual. (cited in Wexler 1981, p. 12)
The application of the criminal justice system did not fit all offenders, such as
persons addicted to alcohol or drugs, sexual deviants, or the mentally ill. Since it was
deemed that their behavior was not necessarily a product of free will, but also not always
predetermined, another legal framework was needed to deal with these offenders. The civil
commitment law provided this framework. Conveniently, psychiatry already had delineated
such behaviors as mental disorders in need of therapeutic interventions. The United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Cal(fomia confirmed the civil law when it argued that
holding a person criminally responsible for an illness of addiction was cruel and unusual
punishment. However, the court held that it would be constitutionally proper to "confine
addicts involuntarily for the express purpose of treatment" (Wexler, 1981, p. l3). Civil
commitment laws were refined over time and strengthened by several court cases; an
excellent account of this development is given by LaFond and Durham (I 992). The basic
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implications of civil commitment laws are clear. Whether free will was present or not may
be the determining factor with criminal insanity defenses and today also with some
substance abuse issues. However, in cases of dementia where, according to current
knowledge, free will is not present, the civil commitment laws give the legal authority for
involuntary commitment to the courts.
To explore how the civil commitment law is applied in an actual setting, the
admission records of a 210-bed geropsychiatric hospital serving about half of the
Commonwealth of Virginia were examined for the year 1994. About 43% of the patients
admitted had a diagnosis of dementia, mainly Alzheimer's type, and another 10% had
Organic Mental Disorder (see table 2) .
. 1994
Ta ble 2 - Ail m1ss1on
. . D'iagnos1s

N

DSM-111-R Diagnosis

Percent

Various Demcnlius (mainly J\Izheirner's diseuse and Related Disorders)

57

112.G

Organic Mental Disorder NOS (nol otherwise specified)

13

9.7

<)

G.7

Various Forn1s of Schizophrenia

24

17.9

Mood Disorders

18

134

Others

13

9.7

134

100

Deliriw11

Total

Only two of the total admissions were voluntary; for two data was not available,
and the remaining 130 arrived through the court system. A Temporary Detention Order
(TDO) was used in nearly one-third of the admissions. Forty-six percent of the patients
were involuntarily committed during the commitment hearing in the community or in the
hospital, and 17% were already involuntarily committed in other facilities and then
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transported to the hospital (see table 3).
. . 1994
Ta,e
l 1 3 - Type o f Ad m1ss1on
N

Type of Admission

Percent

Committed

62

46.27

TDO

42

31.34

Committed Transfer

23

17.16

Court Order Transfer

2

1.49

Court Order

I

0.75

Voluntary

2

1.49

Data not available

2

1.49

134

100.00

Total

While some contend that the trend in the United States is toward voluntary
admission (Winick, 1991), this trend obviously does not hold true for the examined
geropsychiatric hospital and for public hospitals in general. This may be related to the
screening procedure and to the preferences of medical staffa, but also to the patients'
perceived inability to make decisions and his or her family's cooperation with the process.
The senior case manager (personal communication, September 1995) explained that
families bring dementia patients into the community mental health clinic asking to "Put
them somewhere. They don't know what they are asking for, they just ask that something
be done." In other instances, according to the interviewee, physicians "work" the system
until they get their patient admitted to a psychiatric facility, because they think this is the
appropriate place, but they do not know or do not care about the legal commitment
criteria.
The commitment process for the Commonwealth of Virginia is outlined by state
law, in the Code of Virginia, sections 37.1-67.1 et. seq. All state laws are somewhat
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similar, so the procedure for Virginia will be repeated verbatim for accuracy as covered in
House Document No. 77. (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1995)
According to the statute, any person having probable cause to believe that
an individual is mentally ill and in need of emergency evaluation for hospitalization
may request a magistrate or judge to issue an emergency custody order for that
individual. The emergency custody order requires that the detainee be taken into
custody and evaluated within a four-hour period by a mental health professional
designated by the community services board in that region. A law enforcement
officer may take a person into emergency custody directly, without an ECO, if
there is probable cause. The person shall remain in custody until a temporary
detention order is issued, or until the person is released. If it appears from all
available evidence that the person is mentally ill and in need of hospitalization, the
judge or magistrate may then issue a temporary detention order on the individual.
Before issuing a TDO, a magistrate or special justice is required to receive
the advice of a mental health professional who has conducted an in-person
evaluation of the individual. The magistrate may omit the evaluation if the
individual has been examined in the last 72 hours by a mental health professional or
if contact with the individual would pose a significant risk to those involved.
Aller a TOO is issued, a law enforcement ollicer is required to execute the
order. The order may be executed by the law enforcement authority in any area of
the Commonwealth and is valid for 24 hours a Iler it is issued. Lf it is not executed
in that time, it expires and a new order must be issued. lndividuals detained under
a TOO are taken to an inpatient hospital for evaluation.
Generally within 48 hours of the issuance of a TDO, the patient must
accept voluntary admission or be given a commitment hearing. lf a TDO is issued
during a weekend or holiday, the time limit may be extended to 96 hours.
The commitment hearing is usually conducted by a special justice. Prior to
the commitment hearing, a special justice must notify the individual of the right to
obtain counsel or have one appointed, the right to apply for voluntary admission,
and the right to a commitment hearing and other due process and procedural
details. The notification constitutes the preliminary hearing. The commitment
hearing follows the preliminary hearing.
During the period between the preliminary hearing and the commitment
hearing, the detainee is to be interviewed by legal counsel. This period is to be
used by the detainee and legal counsel to prepare a case based upon the detainee' s
wishes. The special justice requires that a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist
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perform an evaluation on the detainee. Additional independent psychological
evaluations may be performed at the expense of the detainee.
At the commitment hearing, the special justice hears evidence from
numerous sources concerning the mental state of the detainee and various
treatment or disposition options. The psychologist or psychiatrist requested by the
court to perform an evaluation presents the evaluation either orally or in a written
report. Additional reports by a mental health professional contracted by the
detainee may also be reported in the hearing. The community services board in the
home region of the detainee is requested to submit a report on the individual.
Finally, counsel for the detainee presents the detainee's wishes.
At the conclusion of the commitment hearing, the special justice renders a
judgment. If the special justice decides that the i11dividual, as a result of mental
illness, presents a11 immi11ent danger to self or others, or is i11capable of self care,
and alternatives to involuntary confinement a11d treatment have been deemed
unsuitable and there is no less restrictive alternative, a11 order for involunta,y
inpatient commitment is issued [italics added]. Inpatient commitment may be for
no longer than 180 days and must be to a facility designated by the community
services board that serves the political subdivision of the detainee. [nvoluntary
outpatient commitment may also be ordered if less restrictive treatment alternatives
exist and are suitable.
All patients have a right to appeal the outcome of their commitment
hearings. These appeals can be made to either a jury or a judge at the circuit court
level. 'I he appeal must be filed within 30 days of a commitment ruling.
lf at the end of 180 days of inpatient treatment an individual is still thought
to be in need of involuntary care, a petition may again be filed, and a
recommitment hearing is conducted. Recommitment hearing procedures are the
same as the initial hearing with the exception of the preliminary hearing. No
preliminary hearing is held in the recommitment process (2-5).
In addition to the above procedures, an individual must be age 65 or over to be
considered for admission to the geropsychiatric facilities in Virginia. While it appears that
the procedures are protective of individual rights, exploration of individual components
demonstrate that the practice is often different.
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Does the Civil Commitment Process Work?
Bonnie (1993) writes:
There are only two jurisprudential predicates for confinement in our legal
system: (i) arrest and conviction for criminal conduct; and (ii) therapeutic
commitment under the mental health system based upon findings of mental
illness and imminent (italics added) dangerousness, and on the presumed
connection between the two ... our law does not permit purely preventive
confinement outside of the criminal justice system (20-21).
The dangerousness criterion was implemented to protect patients from unjust
hospitalization. However, research suggests mixed results when evaluating involuntary
hospital admissions (Parry et al., 1989). One report indicates that 94% of admitted
patients display behaviors conforming to dangerousness standards, while two comparable
studies found only 31 % and, respectively, 36% meeting these standards (Segal, 1989).
Admission staff and nurses in the observed geropsychiatric hospital rationalized
that patients wander away from their places of residence, and therefore represented danger
to themselves. Other reasons for admission were an inability to selt'.-care. For instc1.nce,
patients may have lived in deplorable physical environments, may not have eaten properly,
had forgotten to turn off stoves or other heat producing appliances, or had forgotten to
turn the heat on when needed. A social worker from a local Social Services Department
stated after initiating admission to the hospital, "You wouldn't believe how he lived, in a
shack I wouldn't have for my dog. And he was drinking too. It all happened after his wife
died." Obviously, some behaviors can endanger a person while others are only an
annoyance to others.
It appears that the imminent danger criteria is stretched from the original intent to
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protect the individual from suicide and society from homicide. One of the hospital
executives stated that most patients are admitted because they are resistant to care and
cannot self care. This is confirming the findings of Parry et al. (1989), who write that
according to some studies, the basis in 95% of all committed cases, and nearly in all cases
of recommitment, is the inability to self-care without any findings of danger to self or
others. It is ironic that such patients often are admitted from nursing homes or other
residential facilities where they lived because they could not self-care, and where they may
spend their life savings, usually to the point of reaching the poverty level, and nearly every
penny of their social security. Obviously, law does permit purely preventive confinement
outside of the criminal justice system once the mental illness criteria is met. And,
according to Wexler ( 198 I), " ... the diagnostician has the ability to shoehorn into the
mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever reason ... " ( 15).
All patients admitted to the hospital must be prcscreened by their respective
community mental health clinic. The senior case manager remembers the instance of a 78
year old man who was a "wanderer." The prescreeners did not think he needed
hospitalization because the mental illness criteria was not met, but the physician who
attended to the patient assumed dementia, convinced the family that psychiatric care was
needed, and "worked" the system until the patient was admitted. The hospital evaluation
and a series of tests showed that the patient had a recent fall with a head injury, resulting
in some irrational behavior, including wandering which is often present in dementia
patients. The evaluation and testing in the psychiatric hospital, together with some
treatment, allowed the head injury to heal and the patient was discharged. This patient
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should not have been admitted to a mental hospital, but to an acute care hospital.
While it is not known how that particular patient had arrived at the hospital, most
patients arrive via the sheriff's department, often restrained by handcuffs. Restraining
usually depends on the circumstances and the compassion level of the transporting officer.
Nevertheless, transportation of mentally ill patients is the responsibility of sheriff and/or
local police departments according to the Code of Virginia. In fiscal year 1993, 125
sheriffs representing 91% of the sheriffs statewide, reported to have transported nearly
16,000 mental health patients or an average of 140 transports per department at a cost of
$1 .4 million. This does not include those patients being transported by local police
departments other than sheriff's departments. Of these transports, only 10% were related
to forensic patients. Forty-eight percent involved transporting a TDO patient to a hospital;
18% involved transporting an ECO patient to a hospital; 12% were conducted to transport
a TDO patient to a private acute care facility for medical clearance and then transporting
the patient to a public psychiatric hospital for admittance; and I I% involved transporting a
committed patient from one hospital to another hospital (Commonwealth of Virginia,
1995).
In a survey conducted by Joint Legislative and Audit Commission (JLARC), 75%
of the responding sheriffs felt it was their duty to transport mentally ill persons, and it is,
according to the Code of Virginia. However, 78% of them reported a problem with
staffing and funding for these transports. They also seemed to relate the appropriateness of
their duty directly to the dangerousness of the patient. On the other hand, mental health
staff perceive the sheriff's involvement as problematic. Concerns include the
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criminalization of the mentally ill as well as problems with determination of
dangerousness, use of restraints, and lack of training for law enforcement officers in the
area of mental illness (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1995). Obviously, being arrested,
possibly handcuffed, and taken to several places for interrogation are not the most
therapeutic ways to begin "treatment" for an illness. The "series of abasement,
degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self' ( 14) addressed by Goffman (1961)
begin long before a person enters an institution. Alternative options could be ambulances,
privatization of the transportation function, or the utilization of community mental health
staff or family. Recommendations in this direction were dismissed by the previous mental
health commissioner because of the impact such changes could have on other entities. The
transportation issue seems to serve systems better than it serves the patients. However,
transportation is continuously addressed by mental health advocates and actually resulted
in a change as of July I, 1995. Now the committing judge has the option to recommend
that other transportation means be explored. However, while the change has been in place
for about four months now, most patients still arrive in a police vehicle at the hospital.
When the client enters the mental hospital, after prescreening by community mental
health professionals, an evaluation by the hospital physician takes place. However, this
evaluation is mainly conducted to ensure that the patient is not presenting with a physical
illness such as delirium and to arrive at an initial diagnosis. Most referred patients are
deemed to be appropriate for admission once they are transporied. As an additional
safeguard, as of July 1995, a physician with any financial interest in a psychiatric hospital
or ward cannot prescreen a patient in the community and then initiate commitment to that
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hospital. Obviously, this only holds for private sector hospitals.
Additional safeguards are in place in the form of mandatory legal counsel for the
patient and the commitment hearing. Legal counsel may consist of offering the option of
voluntary commitment, explaining procedures and treatment options, and other legal
issues. Parry et al. (1989) write about the attorneys' role in the civil commitment process:
In general, studies have reported low levels of preparation and activity on
the part of attorneys representing mental patients. Attorneys rarely call
witnesses, object to the admission of evidence, explore the use of least
restrictive alternatives (LRA's), or question the conclusions of the clinical
examiner. Furthermore, most appear to have limited experience of mental
health law and frequently defer to the opinions and recommendations of
mental health professionals, functioning more as guardians·ad /item or as
mere bystanders. ( 1)
Additionally, patients are often too unresponsive or too impaired to even
understand the concept and consequences, and family members are relieved to have the
problem taken off their hands. Also, f-amilies usually arc not allowed to make the decision
because legal incompetence is not assumed when a person enters the mental health system.
Furthermore, many families and their advocacy groups would like to see the involuntary
commitment process simplified, regardless of the patients' wishes (Lafond & Durham,
1992). The assumption of the mental health law that families and friends do not always
have the best interest of the patient in mind may be true. However, the parental power has
only moved from families and friends to the state, and it appears that we cannot guarantee
that the state has the patients' best interests in mind.
The judge presiding over the hearing usually accepts the recommendation of the
mental health professionals who evaluated the patient. Lafond and Durheim (1992) write:
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... the courts--traditional mainstay of individual rights--have by and large
ratified formal and informal legal reforms permitting expanded involuntary
detention. They have also indicated greater willingness to defer both to
legislative and executive initiatives and to psychiatric expertise. As a result,
more and more citizens considered mentally ill will likely be confined to
psychiatric institutions in the years to come ( 116).
The usual acceptance of psychiatric opinion by judges is confirmed by Parry et al.
( 1989) who additionally found that judges frequently take the role of attorneys and that
they often fail to advise respondents of some or all of their rights.
Patients are usually committed, but sometimes discharged, based on the
psychiatrist's professional opinion. By the time the institutional physician sees the patients,
they may already have experienced the "arrest" and transportation by police in the
community, as well as extensive "interviewing." So even if the patient is discharged
because he or she was not deemed mentally ill, the series of degradations has already
occurred.
Some proponents of the practice to accept clinical judgement feel that this doe::;
not represent a weakening of the safoguards. Lidz, Mulvey, Appelbaum, and Cleveland
( 1989) offer the following conclusion:
Involuntary commitment is a legal institution designed to facilitate psychiatric
treatment. As such, it involves a unique power in our society to deprive an
individual of liberty .... the mental health professions have a major interest in seeing
that the power is not abused...By and large, clinicians believe that patients are
committable only when they have the characteristic which the law specifies as
making them committable. Moreover, clinicians are fairly reliable in their
judgements of commitability. (l 80)
Others, led by Szasz, hold that the involuntary commitment should be abandoned
once and for all because it unjustly deprives people of their freedom, and commitment
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safeguards and treatment are nothing but a farce.
Taking all of the above into consideration, many dementia patients are not
appropriate candidates for admission to a psychiatric hospital using the involuntary
commitment procedures. First, it can be argued that dementia is not a mental but a
physical illness and as such does not meet commitment criteria for a psychiatric facility.
Current psychiatric and official legal thinking, as well as the thinking of some advocates
for dementia patients, does not concur with this view. Thus, dementia is classified as a
mental illness and the classification is used to detain victims.
Second, danger to self or others must be imminent; a condition rarely met by the
frail elderly because they simply do not have the physical capacity to carry out dangerous
actions. Additionally, dementia patients, by the very nature of their illness, do not have the
mental capacity to plan such acts. Dangerous behavior is usually accidental, unintentional,
and not pre-planned.
Finally, substantial inability to self care is a vague concept wide open for
interpretation and social judgement. Many patients come from long-term care settings or
from families who care for them. It is the care setting's inability, often in spite of best
intentions, to care for the geriatric dementia patient; it is not the patients' inability to care
for themselves that brings patients to psychiatric hospitals. They may receive the best
possible care in the psychiatric settings, but it should not be argued that they are there
because they meet legal commitment criteria. The psychiatric hospital is certainly not the
least restrictive alternative (LRA) required by law. In fact, it is estimated that in 55% of
the cases LRAs are not explored, and even when they are considered, they are rarely used
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(Parry et al., 1989).
The changes of the 1960s and 1970s in the commitment procedure, using the legal
system to safeguard mentally ill persons' rights, do not fulfill that function for dementia
patients. The system may be used because there seems to be no better alternative to bring
patients into a setting that may benefit them, but it does not safeguard their rights. So
commitment procedures may be interpreted as acts of rationalized compassion, but they
should not be interpreted as legal safeguards.
Holstein (1993) suggests that
commitment proceedings might be framed as a contemporary 'rationalization' of
compassion. According to Giddens (1979), rationalization is the process of
explaining why we act as we do by giving reasons for our conduct. ..Providing
motives or reasons for action rationalizes it, making it a meaningful and
understandable feature of everyday life. Commitment proceedings thus rationalize
the confinement of selected persons by showing how detention and care result
from the court's organized expression of compassion. ( 183)
Additionally, Holstein (1993) offers the Weberian concept of"formal rationality,"
that is, systems act according to principles and rules based on institutionalized procedures
and, therefore, promote the predictability of bureaucracies. Thus, "commitment
proceedings are bureaucratic manifestations of the desire to rationalize compassionate
intervention" (183). They require increased reliance on expert authority, but reduce the
importance of nonrational factors such as emotions and caring for others. "Abstract laws
and formal procedures, it appears, may eliminate some forms of arbitrariness, but in
exchange they introduce an impersonal monopoly over how compassion, concern, and
control are asserted into people's lives" (Holstein, 1993, p. 184).
While we may lament the passing of those days when parents took care of their
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children, and children in turn took care of their parents as they aged, we can most likely
not bring back those days, and compassion cannot be legislated or mandated. However, by
using bureaucratic systems, based on legal authority, to rationalize our society's inability
to take care of the most vulnerable, and by dehumanizing the process by invoking the legal
system, we may have moved further into the "iron cage" of bureaucratic rationalization
leading to the "polar night of icy darkness" predicted by Weber. We may be closer to the
modern individual that is "a passionless, coldly calculating, and instrumentally rational
actor" (Farganis, 1993, p. l05).
In summary, society has struggled over the centuries to understand out-of-norm
behavior, and treatment of persons considered mentally ill was closely tied to the thinking
of any particular era, but usually included confinement that was sanctioned by the legal
authority of that time. To this date, we have no consensus about the meaning of the
construct of mental illness, especially when illnesses like dementia arc involved that clearly
have organic causation but include psychiatric symptoms. Several safoguards have been
implemented over the years to protect victims from detention based on an abuse of the
involuntary commitment process. Currently, most states require in one form or another
that patients must present imminent danger to themselves or to others, or are substantially
unable to self care, all for reasons of mental illness, before the civil commitment process
and the state's police power can be invoked to confine victims. However, analysis of the
literature and of the admissions of one geropsychiatric hospital revealed that mental illness
and the admission safeguards are subject to elastic interpretation by mental health and
legal professionals. Furthermore, most dementia patients by the nature of their illness may
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not meet these safeguard criteria, even ifwe accept a classification ofmental illness. Many
ofthese patients seem to be detained because they represent social problems, not because
they meet the commitment criteria, thus the safeguards do not work for these patients.
However, ifwe conclude, based on the previous discussion, that many dementia patients
are not meeting requirements for mental illness and the involuntary commitment process
then what are the alternatives? The following chapter will explore settings outside ofthe
mental health system, that is, settings that cannot invoke the legal system to commit
elderly persons.
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Chapter 4 - Dementia, Not as a Mental Illness
While some dementia patients are institutionalized in mental hospitals, many live in
other settings. In this chapter institutionalization in nursing homes will be explored, as well
as other living arrangements such as adult residential homes. With many patients and
families preferring care at home, barriers to such care will be discussed, together with
some suggestions to minimize these barriers.
Alternatives to the Mental Hospital
The de-institutionalization movement did not escape the geriatric population in
America. The rate of Americans over age 65 residing in public mental hospitals dropped
between 1972 and 1987 from 374.6 per 100,000 to 67.6 per 100,000, an 82% decrease. In
1972, 8% of all admissions to public mental health hospitals were over age 65, but in 1987
only 4.5% were in that age group. Nevertheless, 20,000 elderly persons remained in public
mental hospitals in l 987 which constitutes about one-filth of all residents in such facilities,
at a cost of over $1 billion annually (Fogel et al., l 993). Additionally, the graying of
America, together with a renewed emphasis on institutionalization of deviants, may
reverse the previous trend of de-institutionalization. Of those ever being admitted to a
geropsychiatric hospital, an average of 50 to 70% of the patients carry a dementia
diagnosis (Fogel et al., 1993) which concurred with the data from the examined hospital.
However, we may conclude that the recent reduction of patients in the psychiatric
state hospitals not only protects dementia patients from the involuntary commitment
procedures by sheer reduction in number, but also that considerable savings in health care
cost are realized. This would hold true if all of these patients either were mi raculously
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cured and returned to an independent life, or if they went back to families who provided
unpaid, comprehensive care for them. However, neither of these conditions are met.
The Current Status of Non-Hospital Based Care
As previously discussed, beginning with the progressive era, a strong belief in the
benevolence of the state developed, and public officials were encouraged to care for
persons deemed in need. This resulted in an explosive admission of geriatric patients to
mental hospitals. In fact, elderly persons were admitted four times faster than younger
persons. Most of these patients were admitted for medical, social, and economic reasons;
only a few were severely mentally ill. A lack of alternative places to provide care for the
cognitively impaired and frail elderly, and a belief that they needed mainly custodial care,
led to a "dumping" of geriatric patients into state hospitals (Fogel et al., 1993).
However, the Mental Health laws that resulted from the Mental Health Study Act
in l 955 and the inception of Medicaid in 1965 gave rise to increased numbers of nursing
homes. Many of the patients that were discharged from psychiatric hospitals actually were
transinstitutionalized to nursing homes that provided tew, if any, mental health services.
New institutionalization of elderly dementia patients or discharges were made into nursing
homes. Geropsychiatric hospitals or units dramatically decreased their census, and private
and non-federal general hospitals increased their admissions of these patients only
minimally (Fogel et al., 1993). Today, when the term "institutionalization of the elderly" is
used in the literature, nursing home placement is meant, not psychiatric hospital
placement. This transinstitutionalization was most likely not an intended outcome of the
de-institutionalization movement. However, Community Mental Health Centers
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(Cl\1HCs), even though required by a Congressional Amendment in 1975 to provide
specialized services for the elderly and other groups (including children), largely failed to
comply. The funds to meet the amendment requirements were never allocated, and the
implementation of block grants in 1980 under the Alcohol, Drug, and Mental Health
Administration removed the requirements to serve special populations, such as the elderly.
Presently, only 45% of CMHCs offer any type of geriatric services, and the effectiveness
of the offered programs is unknown (Fogel et al., 1993). The service area of the examined
geropsychiatric hospital includes 13 community services boards (CSBs); only two have a
designated geriatric program, and only one has an active outreach program for the older
population. Admissions from these two areas are extremely low, even though they serve
the largest concentration of elderly persons. The CSB with the outreach program, serving
a city of about 200,000, had only t-our admissions to the geropsychiatric hospital in 1994.
The program of that CSB will be discussed later.
Nursing Homes

The discharge of the elderly from the mental hospitals without appropriate
community support resulted in the admission of many patients to nursing homes that
lacked specialized programming and appropriate staffing to serve that population. The
nursing homes became the new back wards for the elderly dementia patients.
To remedy the deplorable conditions in nursing homes, congress passed the
Nursing Home Reform Act, under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) in
198 7. One provision of the act was the requirement for pre-admission screening and
annual resident review (P ASARR) for the presence of mental illness and mental
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retardation, and a requirement that such patients would be sent to specialized treatment
facilities when needed. Specialized treatment was also required for those who did not need
psychiatric hospital care, but who had a mental illness, other than dementia. However,
funding again did not accompany that requirement (Fogel et al., 1993). Amazingly,
dementia type illnesses were excluded from this requirement. Thus, for all practical
purposes, PASARR declassified dementia as a mental illness and, at the same time,
allowed nursing homes to admit these patients freely, but not provide specialized care for
dementia victims, not even for those who needed psychiatric treatment. Dementia
effectively had been classified as a consequence of aging, requiring custodial care only--a
very similar view to the state of mental hospitals prior to the introduction of the Mental
Health Act. This classification was not based on newer medical knowledge, but purely on
policy that served the needs of the nursing home industry. To complicate matters for
legislators, providers, care givers, and patients, dementia and mental illnesses such as
depression frequently coexist, requiring diagnosis and treatment for all conditions.
Recognizing these complicating factors and prompted by litigations, the original P ASA[Ut
requirement underwent several changes. As of 1990, the law stipulated that only persons
with serious mental illnesses are covered by PASARR, and those with secondary diagnosis
of dementia are excluded as long as they do not have a primary diagnosis of serious mental
illness (Fogel et al., 1993). However, Judith Riggs, Director of Federal Policy,
Alzheimer's Association, made an official statement submitted to the Department of
Health and Human Services on January 4, 1993, stating the following:
The Association objects strongly to language in the proposal which
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excludes from the definition of adults with serious mental illness
'Alzheimer's-related dementias unless they co-occur with another
diagnosable disorder.' The effects of this exclusion will be to deny access
to the mental health system, arbitrarily, for persons with Alzheimer's
disease and related disorders -- because of their diagnosis, regardless of
their need for mental health services ... The exception to the exclusion for
Alzheimer's-related dementias that 'co-occur with another diagnosable
disorder' is not adequate to protect persons who need mental health
services. The reality is that persons with Alzheimer's disease who have
psychiatric and behavioral symptoms do not always receive psychiatric
diagnoses of co-occurring disorders, because clinicians have come to
expect these symptoms as part of the primary illness. (Copy of the memo is
available from Ms. Riggs.)
Ms. Riggs (personal communication, April 1995) argues that a declassification of
dementia as a mental illness, while decreasing stigma, would also decrease needed services
to the patients and their families. This argument of the Alzheimer's Association seems to
suggest that the availability of mental health services, regardless where they are offered,
outweighs the stigma and other negative effects. ln response to such concerns expressed
by advocates, several states have programs under development that would provide state
funded services that "wrap around" nursing home care, thus, beginning a continuum of
care.
In addition, OBRA required that the psychosocial and behavioral needs of patients
are met, again without providing funding for the requirement. OBRA also required that
the chemical restraints provided by psychotropic medications must be justified with a
psychiatric diagnosis. However, psychotropic medications and the wide usage of physical
restraints, together with the negative effects of relocation and institutionalization on
psychological well being, actually seem to increase the prevalence of mental illness in
nursing home patients (German et al., 1992) and thus justify the use of these medications.
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The latest plans by the current Republican congress propose that as an outcome of the
Medicare/Medicaid reform "Medicaid patients in nursing homes would lose federal
protection against being overmedicated or forcible restrained" (Richmond Times Dispatch,
September 24, 1995, p. A l 5). One can only imagine what will take place in many nursing
homes if these plans materialize. Nursing homes could effectively play the same role in
dementia care that mental hospitals played prior to the Mental Health Act of 1955, with
conditions so deplorable that advocacy and litigation may be necessary to protect the most
vulnerable in our society.
Considering the combination of all factors, including the impact of OBRA on
nursing homes, it is not surprising that many nursing homes are reluctant to admit persons
with an existing or future chance of a mental illness diagnosis (Estes and Swan, 1993;
Mosher-Ashley et al., 1991). Further complicating is the fact that once a nursing home has
a patient, it may be difficult for them to discharge a patient, even if they cannot meet the
patient's needs any longer. As of 1990, only eight states have specific statutory and/or
program responsibility for persons with Alzheimer's disease: California, Florida,
Maryland, Michigan, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington (Fogel et al.,
1993; Mosher-Ashley et al., 1991). When dementia and mental illness co-exist, it seems to
be a matter of convenience which diagnosis is primary and which is secondary. If a person
with a primary diagnosis of dementia lives in a nursing home and develops a secondary
mental illness such as severe depression, they may not be admitted to state mental
hospitals in most states. On the other hand, if the person has primary depression and
secondary dementia, psychiatric cc,tre in state hospitals is possible, but the nursing home
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has that patient counted against them for PASARR purposes and is required to provide
specialized services until hospitalization is necessary and possible. Nursing homes in
Virginia often bitterly complain that they cannot get patients into the mental health system
once they feel that such patients are too disruptive. Community mental health, as
previously discussed, places low priority on the geriatric population; the state psychiatric
hospitals attempt to admit only patients that meet the legal admission criteria (and the
patients must be pre-screened by community mental health); and private psychiatric units
or hospitals may not want those patients because they are often unable to pay for services.
OBRA, while intending to protect the elderly, actually may have created a no-care zone as
coined by Estes and Swan (1993).
Nevertheless, there is still a large population of dementia patients who represent a
lucrative market for the nursing home industry. ln response, many nursing homes have
developed specialized Alzheimer's units. Presently, about I 0% of nursing homes have
such special care units (Cotter, 1995). Although some of these units are statled adequately
with well-trained persons and provide a desirable conducive environment for dementia
patients, many are simply blocked off areas with locked doors. The admission director of a
nursing home, operated by a large chain, explained that their specialized unit has to be
locked because the facility is so close to a busy street. Staff working on the unit get special
training consisting of one hour of instruction for two weeks which totals ten total training
hours. They rotate all staff every six months off the unit as a stress-reduction strategy for
staff, even though they know that such abrupt staHing changes add to the confosion of the
patients, and may result in adverse or even catastrophic patient reactions. (A catastrophic
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reaction is a clinical term used to describe extreme confusion and aggression or resistance
in patients, that may lead to psychiatric treatment on various levels.) The admission
director said, "It's bad, we know it is bad to change all staff at the same time; they should
do it gradually, but they won't listen to me." But the patients have a nice large courtyard
where they can walk, and the unit is in subdued colors so external stimulation is reduced.
Eating is done in shifts so staff can pay more attention to patients and the dining room is
less busy, and "the activity person for that unit is really good and caring" (personal
communication, September 1995). Obviously, while there is some effort to provide a
therapeutic environment for the dementia patients, the high expense of losing staff and
having to replace them, supersedes the residents' needs.
Although other means than locking units are available, they are costly. For
instance, some nursing homes equip patients that are known to wander with special
wristbands that set off an alarm when the patient leaves a designated area. But it requires
staff to return a patient to a safe area, and staff is expensive, more expensive than a lock
on a door. While some nursing homes are excellent, and others are good, many nursing
homes have become other places of involuntary confinement and they have become the
new back wards in the community (Mosher-Ashley et al., 1991). However, the
"involuntary" confinement is based on coercion from family members, or simply a lack of
alternatives; it is not invoking the legal system. Such confinement may be supported by the
patient's physician. One interviewed physician stated that, in general, he advises families
not to attempt to provide home care once a patient is not easily controlled any longer; that
is, obeys the care giver, and when the patient is incontinent. He said that it is his
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experience that families cannot last as care givers under these conditions (personal
communication, September 1995). There was no mentioning of advice or referral to
community resources, even though many projects have shown that community resources
can prevent institutionalization, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
Obviously, while attempts were made to regulate the nursing home industry and
protect patients, funding and enforcement did not follow the policies, and thus high quality
nursing home care still depends on the organizational philosophy of the individual homes
and the dedication of staff. Presently, it appears that nursing homes are not the best
solution to the problem of caring for an ever increasing population of dementia patients,
even though they are one of the options. The following will explore some other options.
Adult or Boarding Homes and Other Assisted Living Options
Currently, approximately 32,000 board and care homes are licensed in the United
States, with an additional unknown number of non-licensed facilities. The licensed
facilities provide room and board and various levels of assistance to about 500,000 older
persons (Clemmer, l 994).
Adult or rest homes (adult care residences is the current appropriate term in
Virginia) are widely utilized by the mental health system as a discharge setting for the
mentally ill, and they are also often the first institutional setting for elderly persons when
they leave their own home. Rest homes are long-term care facilities that care for persons
who are aged or mentally or slightly physically disabled, but do not require nursing or
medical care. Traditionally, nursing homes care for the more physically impaired, while
adult homes care for those persons less physically but more mentally impaired. Adult
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homes are a much less restrictive environment than psychiatric hospitals or nursing homes,
but consequently also provide less "treatment" or programming. Many rest homes are
small family-operated facilities. In Virginia, the administrator is only required to have a
high-school diploma, and no nursing staff is required. Legislative attempts to require at
least one nurse on staff has so far successfully been avoided in Virginia by lobbyists for the
adult home industry. Many of these homes are licensed so they meet minimum safety,
staffing, and training requirements. A licensing official called the rest home "a home away
from home," thus, residents cannot be required or forced to do anything they could not be
forced to do at home. Of course, if residents become too difficult to manage, transfer,
often to a mental hospital, is always a possibility.
Obviously, this type of residential setting provides more of a home-like
atmosphere, together with some assistance and supervision when needed. However,
governmental reports confirm reports from the popular media and advocacy gr ups that
this industry is "plagued with allegations of abuse and low quality of care" (Clemmer,
1995, p. 3).

The rest home may be an appropriate and ofl:en successful alternative for the early
stages of dementia when supervision is the main concern and care at home is not possible.
They do not provide any treatment for dementia patients, only custodial care, thus the
disease is in the realm of"normal" aging. Transfer to a nursing home or psychiatric facility
often occurs in the later stages of the illness when symptoms become less manageable.
Adult homes in Virginia that admit persons with mental illness from psychiatric
facilities have an agreement with their local CSB or a private mental health professional
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for the provision of mental health services. Mental health services may include screening
for admission to a psychiatric facility, but also staff training and consultation as to avoid
other levels of institutionalization.
Assisted living or congregate housing arrangements are a yet less restrictive living
environment, focusing on preservation of residents' autonomy. They usually offer room
and board, social and recreational activities, assistance to persons needing help with
personal care and medications, monitoring and protective oversight, and 24-hour help
when needed. However, over half of the persons living under these arrangements move
into nursing homes or hospitals when their needs increase. Some states also limit the level
of help that can be provided in such facilities (Clemmer, 1994). These programs are often
highly individualized toward the needs of the residents, and are a valid option for the early
stage patient when in-home care is not available. However, they are not widely available
and are expensive, and oH:en are not a lasting alternative for dementia patients as the
disease progresses and the patients' needs move beyond the capability and mission of
these facilities.
Home Care
Institutionalization, regardless on which level, is costly on a financial and personal
level, but often it is the only solution for elderly dementia sufferers who have no family
and can no longer function independently in their homes. But for those who have a care
giver, staying at home may be the best solution. Most elderly persons, including dementia
sufferers, want to stay at home as long as they can express their preferences, and we do
not know once they cannot express their wishes any longer. As the director of an aging
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association stated, recalling a personal experience from her family, "They [the elderly]
want to stay home, they want to stay on the f arm" (personal communication, September
1995).

Most families want to provide care at home, too, and often make truly heroic
efforts to avoid institutionalization. Additiormlly, some studies have supported that care at
home is cheaper than institutional care (Estes and Swan, 1993). For instance, Coughlin
and Liu (1989) found that the annual cost fer nursing home care for cognitively impaired
persons was $22,300, and for community care $11,700. However, it was not disclosed
how comprehensive the home care was, so these figures need to be regarded with caution.
The Medicare Alzheimer's Disease Demom;tratio11 that was contracted by congress to
explore whether comprehensive community services, including intensive case management
and fa mily education, would delay institutirn1alization allowed a direct cost of $300.00 per
client/per month and, respectively, $500.00 per client/per month for a control group
(Manning, 1993). This seems much cheaper than institutional care, but does not include
the extensive support staff required to admi 1ister such a program, nor does it include costs
1
for physicians and medications. Nevertheless, with community care preferred by the
patients and their families and possible cost benefits available, why are millions still
institutionalized in mental hospitals, nursing homes, and rest homes?
Several studies have attempted to explore which factors affect the decision to
institutionalize elderly dementia patients (Cohen et al., 1993; Coughlin and Liu, 1989;
Koopman et al., 1988; Lieberman and Kramer, 1991; Severson et al., 1988) resulting in a
wide variety of conflicting findings. However, in general it appears that spouses may opt
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for in-home care as long as their own health will allow it, while children, other relatives, or
non-family informal care givers may opt for institutional placement of the patients
(German et al., 1992; Lieberman and Kramer, 1991; Mittleman et al., 1993). Troublesome
behavior, such as aggressive behavior and incontinence, was not always predictive of
consequent institutionalization and neither was the availability of community resources.
However, community-based resources were helpful when they carefully focused on the
specific needs of the care givers. Mittleman et al. (1993) found that specific, individualized
counseling for care givers, together with intensive case management, delayed
institutionalization significantly and often avoided it altogether. Especially in the middle
stage of AJzheimer's disease, when patients display the most disturbing behaviors such as
wandering, delusions and hallucinations, the counseling was very effective. Family
members understood the transitional nature of these behaviors and waited out that stage of
the disease. The non-placement of patients could also be explained by the reluctance of
nursing homes to accept such difficult patients, and the state mental hospitals in New York
(where the study was conducted) will no longer admit dementia patients. The Mittleman
study is noteworthy, because it offers an effective model how community interventions
could be structured. They maintain that "it is essential to provide care givers with
sufficient support to mitigate the emotional and physical toll of caring for Alzheimer's
disease patients in order to extend the time that home care remains an option, without
jeopardizing the well-being of the care giver or the patient" (739). The lvledicare
Alzheimer's Disease De111011stratio11 (Manning, 1993) arrived at similar conclusions even
though as we shall see later, Medicare will not pay for these services.
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The effectiveness of focused community support and intensive case management is
also demonstrated by the previously mentioned geriatric component of a community
services board serving a city of 200,000 in Virginia. The director of that program stated in
a personal communication (April 1995) that case management provides for coordination
of services in that city. Once a dementia patient enters their caseload, they utilize private
psychiatric hospitals, usually on a voluntary basis, for short-term treatment to stabilize
acute episodes of behaviors that care givers cannot handle and that qualify for psychiatric
treatment. The 190 day lifetime limit for inpatient treatment of mental illnesses allowed by
Medicare is deemed sufficient for the management of acute episodes, for those dementia
patients who enter the mental health system usually for the first time. After stabilization of
the acute episode, services such as adult day care and home health care, often from
religious non-profit organizations, are secured. Reforral to other private or public
resources is coordinated, based on the clients' ability to pay for services, and arrangements
for financial services will be made when needed. When caregiving at home is not possible,
adult homes specializing in dementia care may be utilized. These efforts are designed to
keep the patient in the community, ideally in his or her own home. It must be noted that
the director of the program attributes their success in keeping clients out of institutions to
his thorough understanding of dementia-type illnesses and his ability to effectively network
among the widely fragmented services, and to the case managers' dedication and
willingness to go far beyond their required duty to ensure the well-being of their clients.
He also recognizes that many services are only available in urban areas and that the same
coordination may represent a much bigger problem in rural areas.
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The case management approach was not as unconditionally supported by Thelma
Bland, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department for the Aging (personal
communication, September 1995). Among the community services administered by this
department are the local area agencies on aging (AAAs) that provide a variety of
programs for the elderly, such as assistance with housekeeping, shopping, personal care,
and meal preparation. Some AAAs provide adult day care, respite services for care givers,
home repairs to ensure safety, legal assistance, and meal sites for the elderly. While
Commissioner Bland believes that some barriers that keep elderly persons from receiving
available services are 1) a lack of knowing about it, 2) reluctance to accept a "handout,"
and 3) long waiting lists for services, she still thinks that it is absolutely necessary that
families and patients participate actively in their own care. "They need education and
information, so they don't rely entirely on case management." Education of policy makers,
family members, insurance carriers, and the general public was suggested by her to raise
awareness for the plight of dementia patients and their families.
Returning to the services of community mental health, one city rarely is using the
option of the inpatient mental hospital, while a neighboring city with similar services is one
of the largest users of the geropsychiatric facility. The Clinical Director of that CSB stated
in a personal communication (February, 1995) that they cannot serve dementia patients
because they a) do not consider them seriously mentally ill; thus they are not required to
serve them, and b) they do not have the necessary resources to serve the seriously
mentally ill younger population in their community. The availability of the geropsychiatric
hospital and the involuntary commitment procedure seem to bring patients from that area
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to the hospital, not the lack of community resources outside of the mental health clinic.
However, according to the Senior Case Manager (personal communication,
September 1995) community mental health clinics are in a dilemma. To provide case
management on a reimbursable basis, the client must meet the serious mentally ill criteria
that stipulates that the clients must ( 1) have had more than one psychiatric hospitalization
in the past, (2) be on some kind of disability or public support, and (3) must have had
more inpatient than outpatient treatment and care in the past. Most dementia patients may
not meet these requirements and, therefore, may not be able to get the case management
that brings community resources within their awareness and reach. Therefore, even if the
client could be assisted in the community, psychiatric hospitalization may be required to
meet the hospitalization and inpatient treatment requirements. Once the patient meets
these requirements, community assistance, including case management, can be offered and
is reimbursable. This is a vicious cycle for the client and community mental health, creating
a segment of dementia patients that may be hospitalized so that they can be labeled as
seriously mentally ill for no other reason than to receive community support that was
designed to prevent institutionalization. So it is not the mental health directors' opinion
that dementia is not considered a serious mental illness; the dementia patients simply do
not fit the requirements under normal circumstances and may not get the services they
need and that may be available.
But even when community resources are available and adequate, and case
management can be provided to coordinate the widely fragmented services, the question
still remains who will provide home care and how can families provide it. lt is very
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possible that adult children have responsibility for two sets of parents because longevity
has increased. Additionally, many families also have some responsibility for children who
return home, often with their children, while aging parents also need care. The term
"Sandwich Generation" is often used for that middle-aged group that provides support for
parents and children. It is usually women who fulfill the "filial duties" of providing day-to
day care for elderly relatives (Martin and Post, 1992). And these women, who have at
great sacrifice provided about 70 to 80% of the informal care to aging parents, are often in
the workforce (Estes and Swan, 1993; Manning 1993).
Disregarding all these problems, community care is promoted by both progressive
and conservative forces, but for different reasons. Conservatives may see the benefit of
community care in the cost savings for the public sector, especially when the f ree labor is
provided by women. ln addition, caregiving restores the traditional role of women in the
patriarchal family. On the other hand, progressives sec social policy which provides
community care as a mechanism to a) increase public responsibility for entitlement for
much needed long-term care, b) redress the unequal burden currently carried by women,
and c) empower care givers and care recipients. Estes and Swan (1993) write:
Lloyd characterizes the two major positions on community care in terms of
conflict and consensus discourse. The consensus discourse represents
gatekeeping and the distribution of community-care resources as benign
and unproblematic... the conflict discourse emphasizes the 'structural
contradictions and conflicts of individual interests, oppositions' inherent in
social situations (Lloyd, 1991, p. 129). The conflict discourse attend to the
participation and power concerns of older persons faced with the
increasingly bureaucratized and rationalize structures of service delivery
and the professionalization of geriatric assessment and case management.
(260)
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The bureaucratized and rationalized structure of service delivery is not only
problematic for the older persons but also for their care givers. Presently, it is complicated
to understand the rules and regulations that allow persons to utilize any resources.
Additionally, the gatekeeping bureaucrats often do not understand that their systems are
not as clear to potential clients as they are to them, and they do not always refer to other
services available. Of course, they may also not be aware of all other and frequently
overlapping services, or they do not understand or do not trust resources from other
systems, or they may have some other reasons not to acknowledge other services. It often
becomes too difficult for care givers to "work the system," so they do without resources
or elect to institutionalize the care recipient. Even though case management is another step
in the bureaucratization, at least a dedicated case manager can coordinate all services, and
relieve the care giver from that burden. Lt is unfortunate that the sheer luck of place of
residence, the personal dedication of case workers, and the linancial ability of the patients
or their families determines whether a dementia victim can stay at home as long as
possible, thus maintaining as much life satisfaction and dignity as possible.
Adult Day Services

Among the many barriers to home health care is a lack of respite for care givers
and the out-of-home employment of the primary care giver. Recognizing this, a new
option is emerging with adult day services, formerly called adult day care. The number of
such centers has increased from less than L 5 only twenty years ago, to over 3,000 in 1994.
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, technically supported by The Bowman Gray
School of Medicine in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, carried out the first national four68

year demonstration project (1988-1992) that focused on day centers and respite services
for persons with dementia. Results of this project suggest that such centers can provide
effective day care for dementia patients, even for those that display behavior problems
considered dangerous to self and others. Specific programming targeting the needs of the
patients and families and focused marketing increase visibility of these programs and make
them valuable resources for dementia patients and their care givers (Cox and Reifler,
1994). According to Nancy Cox, one of the program managers, the encouraging results of
the program prompted the Foundation to announce a successor in 1992 that will include
even more day centers (personal communication, September 1995).
Programs that support home care seem to validate dementia as an illness that can
usually be managed at home with some assistance, but in special circumstances requires
institutionalized care on various levels. This is similar to most other illnesses that are
managed at home with the assistance of a physician, a nurse, other family members, or
friends, and that require institutional care only in the worst of circumstances. Dementia, as
a long-term illness takes a special toll on care givers, and home care is not the best
solution for everyone, but when dementia is removed from the area of "normal" illness and
moved into custodial care or mental illness categories, institutionalization is the routinely
preferred treatment option.
To summarize, the Mental Health Study Act resulted in widespread
deinstitutionalization that included elderly dementia patients. However, communities were
not prepared to absorb and care for these patients, so many were transinstitutionalized into
nursing homes. Deplorable conditions in many nursing homes resulted in federal
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regulations that were intended to provide adequate care for dementia patients, but actually
resulted in declassification of dementia as a mental illness and unofficial re-classification as
aging deterioration that is not an illness at all. Consequently, some nursing homes provide
excellent care to dementia patients while others are "warehouses." Alternatives to nursing
homes are adult or boarding homes or assisted living communities that provide more of a
home-like atmosphere, but often lack appropriate staffing and programming for dementia
patients. Therefore, they usually discharge dementia patients into nursing homes or
psychiatric hospitals when care becomes too difficult.
Most patients and families prefer that the patient is cared for at home, just like it is
customary in most other illnesses. Studies show that barriers to such care can be overcome
through supportive measures, including intensive case management that includes
coordination of available resources, and programs that provide respite for care givers such
as adult day care services. However, these services arc presently reserved for those who
can find and afford them, thus institutionalization of dementia patients for custodial care is
oHen an alternative.
As can be seen from the previous chapters, the classification of dementia as a
mental illness or not as a mental illness has implications on what system can be evoked. All
systems, including home care by non-family members, are regulated and driven by social
policy. While individual value systems play a role, it is ultimately societal values reflected
in social policy and consequent funding, or lack thereof: that decide the outcome for those
affected. Therefore, the next chapter will address how services are funded, and how this
funding is reflected in the care decisions made by family members and the public sector.
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Chapter 5 - Payment for Dementia Care
As shown in chapters three and four, dementia patients and their families have a
variety of treatment and care options, from keeping the patient at home and perhaps
utilizing available services to support home care, to institutional placement in nursing or
rest homes and psychiatric long-term hospitals. But how are those services paid and what
are we doing as a society to support persons who are needy based on illness?
This chapter will explore the social policy in America that is the basis for Medicare
and Medicaid, the main payor for health care services for the elderly population.
Furthermore, how this social policy has become dysfunctional for the original population
but has become functional for others, will be discussed. The chapter will conclude by
exploring the role of bureaucracy in that particular social policy.
The question of payment may not be of utmost importance to those who arc
wealthy. We may never hear that one of the famous victirr1s of Alzheimer's disease, former
President Reagan and his family, will have to struggle to pay for his care, even though
their emotional struggle may not be less than that of any other family. However, payment
for services becomes of utmost importance to most patients and families, and, unless a
patient or family has sufficient funds to pay for treatment and care, social policy based on
social security laws governs how reimbursement can be obtained.
Social Policy in America
According to the Social Security Bulletin (1987), industrialized countries
recognized that the agrarian era support system for the needy, consisting mainly of
families, charity, and local government, was insufficient to meet the needs of more and
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more urban and industrialized societies. However, each country tailored social public
policy programs to its specific situation. The American program was influenced by the size
of the nation, ethnic diversity, and a tradition of self-reliance based on frontier
experiences. Beginning with their introduction, social programs were pragmatic and
incremental, based on specific needs not necessarily on values and philosophies. Policies
and programs appear to be reactive rather than proactive. Additionally, American social
programs are characterized by decentralization and by a large involvement of the private
sector in the administration of such programs.
Beginning in the 1920s, government realized that social insurance principles would
best meet the needs of a progressively more industrialized nation. This means that risk is
pooled and premiums paid by employer and/or employees could be used when a need for
assistance arises through old age, illness, unemployment, disability, or death. Based on this
system of contribution, benefits are paid as an eamed right not as a charity. As early as
l 908, federal law was enacted that protected workers fron1 disability incurred on the job.
The depression of the l 930s prompted additional federal action.
In January l 935, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed to congress long-range
economic security recommendations embodied in the report of a specially created,
Cabinet-level Committee on Economic Security. Identical legislation was
introduced in the House and Senate and there followed the passage of the Social
Security Act, signed into law on August 14, 1935 (Social Security Bulletin, 1987,
p. 7).
During the depression, private health insurance began to emerge, with Blue Shield
partially covering doctor bills, and Blue Cross covering hospitalization. However, this
coverage was mainly available through employee plans or to those who could pay for it.
The elderly and poor were often unprotected (Popenoe, l 993).
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Medicare and Medicaid - Security for the Old and the Poor
In reaction to arising needs, the basic program of Social Security was amended,
and Medicare was established in 1965, providing medical insurance for nearly everyone
aged 65 or older. Similar to the private insurance that provided the model for Medicare,
inpatient and outpatient care were separated, with Part A partially covering
hospitalization, and Part B covering outpatient services. At the same time, title XIX of the
Social Security Act instituted Medicaid. That state-operated program provides federal
matching funds to states to help offset the cost of medical care to the indigent population.
For the poorest segment of the population, congress replaced in 1972 a previously existing
program for the needy aged, blind, and disabled with the Federal Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) program (Social Security Bulletin, 1987). It is noteworthy that these
programs had their roots in the Progressive Era, where the state not the community or the
individual decided what was be8t' and evolved into the Liberal era with it8 dream for the
"Great Society." Government was for the first time deeply inv olved in providing health
care for a segment of the population; taking care of the needy in a community was no
longer the major responsibility of individuals or charities. lt seems that social policy is not
only a reaction to a need, but is still a reflection of societal values and beliefs at a given
time. At first glance, it appears that all is well for dementia patients because they are
usu ally over age 65, and Medicare should cover their illness. Yet, a closer look will show
that only illnesses that are traditionally considered "physical" and "curable" are partially
covered by Medicare. As a representative from the Health Care and Financing
Administration (HCFA), who administers Medicare and Medicaid stated: "These programs
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are meant to be a financial protection against acute short-term illnesses--and they do that
very well" (personal communication, October 1995).
Medicare - Part A - Inpatient Care and Beyond

Table 4 will demonstrate which services are partially covered under Medicare Part
A, followed by an exploration how this relates to the care for dementia patients.

.

' A- 1995
T·,blc 4 - Medicare
' Part
Services
HOSPITALIZATION
Semiprivate room and board, general nursing and other
hospital services and supplies.

SKILLED NURSING FACILITY CARE
Semiprivate room and board, skilled nursing and
rehabilitative services and other services and supplies.2

Benefit
First 60 days
61st to 90th day
91st to 150 day

Medicare Pays
All but $716
All but $179 a day
1

Beyond 150 days
f-irst 20 days
Additional 80 days
Oeyond I 00 days

All but $358 a day
Nothing
I 00% of approved amount
All but $89.50 a day
Nothing

Unlimited as long as
I 00'¾, or approved
HOME HEALTH CARE
patient meets Medicare
amount; 80'¾, or approved
Purl-lime or intermittent skilled cure, home heullh aide
amount !'or durnhk:
services, durable medical equipment und supplies and olher conditions.
medical equipmenl.
services.
1-\)1" us long us doctor
/\II hut limited costs for
I lOSPICli C/\RI•:
certifies need.
oulpulicnl dru 'Sund
Puin relief, symptom 1111111uge111cnt und support services lix
the tcrminully ill.
i11pulic11l rc.-pilc cure.
1
This 60-rcserve days bcnclit 111uy be used only once i11 a lifolimc.
2
Neither Medicare nor private Mcdigup insurance will pay lor most nursing home cure
Adapted from: Your Medicare 1 -lundbouk, 1995. Deparlmcnt o1 l lealth und 1-lumun Services

Hospitalization

Medicare Pait A will help to pay for a maximum of 190 days inpatient care in a
psychiatric hospital in a lifetime on the same level as it will pay for any other hospital.
Psychiatric care in a non-psychiatric hospital is not subject to the 190 day lifetime limit.
The help during the 190 days may very well be sufficient for dementia patients who have
some savings and require only stabilization of an acute episode of unmanageable behavior
to be returned to a care giver at home. Of course, if the patient has a coexisting physical
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illness that requires hospitalization in conjunction with psychiatric treatment, Medicare
will help out longer, and the hospital days will not count toward the 190 days inpatient
lifetime limitation for psychiatric hospitalization. However, because dementias, especially
of the Alzheimer's type, are not recognized as physical illnesses per se, patients are usually
not hospitalized for the treatment of their dementia, unless, as previously mentioned, they
present with a coexisting physical illness. To complicate matters, Alzheimer's patients are
usually diagnosed with less chronic or acute physical illnesses than non-dementia patients.
Some (Hirsh, 1994) suspect that perhaps these patients are simply under-diagnosed and
under-treated because physicians view them as terminally ill anyway.
One of the interviewed physicians had additional explanations for the decreased
prevalence of illness in dementia patients (personal communication, September l 995).
According to him, dementia patients in advanced stages cannot communicate their
symptoms, or if they express them in an unusual manner, they may be dismissed as
confi.1Sed. Those in institutional settings such as hospitals have a belter chance to be
diagnosed during routine examinations. Furthermore, since dementia is a terminal illness,
patients simply may not live long enough to be diagnosed. However, there may be a more
serious reason. Physicians, based on their own professional ethics and personal value
system, may decide that a diagnosis leads to a requirement of treatment. The physician
may find such treatment useless based on his or her judgment of quality of life, especially
when late-stage dementia patients are involved. The interviewed physician usually
recommends to the family of late-stage dementia patients who develop serious illness that
no active treatment but only comfort measures be implemented. If the family insists on
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treatment, the physician "will do as little as possible" within the family's wishes. There
also appears to be some networking among physicians so they support each other in
"doing as little as possible." Dementia patients frequently die of secondary infections,
often respiratory. Healthcare professionals', and often families', disengagement with those
patients who are considered beyond hope, especially if they are institutionalized, was
explored by Sudnow (1967) and by Glaser and Strauss (1968) within the framework of
social death' which will be discussed in the next chapter.
With Medicare paying only under very limited circumstances for psychiatric
hospitalizations, many patients end up in state-operated facilities. One physician suspected
that the private hospitals "pack their [the patients] bags once Medicare or private
insurance runs out." Even those patients who have some savings usually spend down very
fast to Medicaid eligibility. And the state-operated hospital that charges on a per-diem rate
of only $200.00 per day for comprehensive care, can "help" patients to spend down very
quickJy. Payment in the state-operated hospital is completely nontransparent, even for
those who attempt to understand it. The reimbursement officer makes decisions on an
individual basis, even though some rules seem to apply. However, most patients who enter
that hospital are already Medicaid eligible, and Medicaid is the major payer for that
facility.

Nursing Facilities
The next option on the list of Medicare Part A are skilled nursing facilities. As the
footnote in Table 4 clearly states, Medicare will not pay for most nursing home care, and
the partial payment is limited to 100 days, surely not enough for the dementia patient
76

under most circumstances. When Medicare pays for part of nursing home care, only
skilled care is covered, and only few nursing homes are certified as skilled nursing
facilities. Custodial care is not covered.
Skilled vs. Custodial Care
Interestingly, custodial care has never been defined by congress, and thus the
concept led to litigation. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia
Circuit, decided on May 15, 1987, in Barnett v. Weinberger that CHAMPUS, the civilian
insurance for the military, was required to pay for care that the insurance carrier
considered "custodial." Rachael Barnett, a l 0-year old military dependent, was "the victim
of a disabling and incurable neurological condition ... she is generally comatose, severely
retarded, incontinent, and unable to dispose of bodily secretions that may collect in her
throat ... as a result, Rachael must be fod, dressed, exercised, and cleansed by an
attendant" (818 E-ederal Reporter, 2d Series, pp. 954-955). Rachael's conditions sounds
very much like a late-stage Alzheimer's patient's, except for the age factor. The insurance
carrier maintained that "Rachael's disorder is incurable, no rehabilitative or other
treatment to improve her condition has been prescribed ... hospitalization supplied only
'custodial care"' (p. 955), and therefore, CHAMPUS benefits should cease. CHAMPUS is
a statutorily-authorized military-dependent care system, just like Medicare is a statutorily
authorized care system for the aged. Both programs exclude domiciliary or custodial care,
and so do private insurance carriers. For the previously mentioned case, both parties
attempted to define custodial care. The insurance carrier defined custodial care as
rendered to a patient
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(i) who is disabled mentally or physically and such disability is expected to
continue and be prolonged and (ii) who requires a protected, monitored or
controlled environment whether in an institution or in the home, and (iii) who
requires assistance to support the essentials of daily living, and (iv) who is not
under active or specific medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment that will reduce
the disability to the extent necessary to enable the patient to function outside the
protected, monitored, or controlled environment. The regulation provided that it is
not the condition itself that is controlling, but whether the care being rendered falls
within the definition of custodial care ... and the determination of custodial care in
no way implies that the care being rendered is not required by the patient; it only
means that it is the kind of care that is not covered under the basic program (p.
959).
The court decided for Rachael Barnett based on previous cases involving the
Social Security Act and, consequently, cases involving senior citizens. While congress
completely failed to define custodial care, the courts usually interpreted this type of care as
"provided by a lay person without special skills [italics added] and not requiring or
entailing continued attention of trained or skilled personnel" (p. 968). However in Ridgely
l

v. Secretcuy <l the Oepart111e11t <! Health, l�d11catio11 and We/fare, the United States
District Court, D. Maryland, decided on July 5, 1972, lor Ms. Ridgely who flied for the
estate of her mother, Mrs. Hape. l\llrs. Hape, at age 86, was transferred to a nursing borne
aH:er hip surgery for convalescence care. Medicare paid for care from April l , through
June 1O; payment ceased on June 11, because Medicare determined that her care was only
custodial in nature. Her attending hospital physician had requested nursing home care,
because the patient was c01r/11sed [italics added] which could lead to interference with the
healing of her hip fracture. Mrs. Hape was not able to understand or follow the
instructions given to her by the physician and care givers. She was also i11cu11ti11e11t [italics
added] and had hearing loss. Mrs. Hape could not recuperate at home because of her
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confusion (345 Federal Supplement). Mrs. Hape displayed the symptoms and problems of
dementia patients, but had the "good luck" to also have a broken hip which allowed the
case to go to court. Chief Judge Northrop, who preceded over this case, rejected the idea
that the exclusion of custodial care was meant to reduce benefits. He concluded:
Indeed, it appears to this Court that the purpose of the custodial care
disqualification in § 1395y(a) (9) was not to disentitle old, chronically ill and
basically helpless, bewildered and confused people like Mrs. Hape from the broad
remedy which congress intended to provide for our senior citizens. Rather, the
provision was intended to stop cold-blooded and thoughtless relatives from
relegating an oldster who could care for him or herself to the care of an ECF
[Extended Care Facility] merely so that oldster would have a place to eat, sleep, or
watch television. But when a person is sick, especially a helpless old person, and
when those who love that person are not skilled enough to take care of that
person, congress has provided a remedy in the Medicare Act, and that remedy
should not be eclipsed by an application of the law and findings of fact which are
blindly bureaucratic economics to the purpose of the congress (345 Federal
Supplement, p. 993).
The other case used as a precedence in the Barnett case involved Kuehler v.
Secreta,y (f/-Jealth and li11111a11 Services that was decided in favor of Kuebler, the
Plaintin: on February 7, 1984, in the United States District court, E.D. New York. Mrs.
Kuebler, a 7 I-year old patient, was transferred from a hospital, after a back injury
resulting from a fall, to a nursing home with
progressive cerebral arteriosclerosis with brain atrophy ... suffered from periods of
confusion during which she did not recognize her husband and did not know her
name. She also had episodes of agitated, assaultive and abusive behavior and a
history of wandering about, both at her home and at San Simeon [the nursing
home]. Such wandering occasioned the fall that caused the back injury .... Haldol,
a psychotropic drug, was prescribed as needed to control agitation (Federal
Supplement 579, p. 1438)
Based on Ridgely v. Secreta,y �f HEW and other similar cases, the court in this
case decided that
79

Mrs. Kuebler' s condition shows progressive deterioration to the point where she
was a danger to her own well-being and needed skilled care ... Although many
specific services rendered to Mrs. Kuebler were routine and seemingly unskilled, in
the aggregate they were treatment of her medical condition. And also taken singly
Mrs. Kuebler' s ailments might not seem to require skilled nursing care, taken
together they made her a chronically ill, disabled old woman in need of monitoring
...To contend that her care was merely custodial and therefore could have been
provided by a lay person is to ignore the fact that a lay person, in the form of her
husband, was unable to provide adequate care (pp. 1439-1440).
Mrs. Kuebler was most likely a dementia patient in the middle to late stage of the
illness. In fact, her dementia produced the fall that allowed her to be reimbursed for part of
her nursing home care.
The court in the Barnett case concluded that
To suggest that a victim of a catastrophic illness ... is receiving 'custodial care'
simply because the 'primary' portion of her attendants' time is spent providing for
her elemental needs is patently misguided ... Indeed, further extension of the
perverse logic advanced by the Department would reveal that the more debilitating
the ailment affecting a claimant, the more likely the care will be termed 'custodial,'
since even the simplest bodily task will require assistance and supervision (818
Federal Reporter, 2d series, p. 969).
Following the logic of the previously explored decisions, dementia patients should
freely have access to Medicare reimbursement for their nursing home care. Even though
all discussed cases had a physical illness element, the care included the type of care that
traditionally may be termed custodial. Ironically, because dementia is not considered the
right kind of illness (only physical illnesses are reimbursable) it has always been excluded
from Medicare payment. Therefore, patients and families have no grounds to open
litigation even it: based on the previously discussed cases, they may have a chance that the
courts would decide in their favor.
Medicare considers care custodial "when it is primarily for the purpose of helping
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the patient with daily living or meeting personal needs and could be provided safely and
reasonably by people without professional skills or training. For example, custodial care
includes help in walking, getting in and out of bed, bathing, dressing, eating and taking
medicine" (Department of Health and Human Services, 1995, p 7).
However, the term "skilled care" still needs exploration. The previous cases
provide some guidelines by maintaining that such care could not be provided by a lay
person, and the Medicare definition of custodial care also has the professional skills or
training component without defining what professional training is. Without any training
and education, most untrained lay persons could not provide care for an Alzheimer's
disease patient. One needs to learn how to construct an environment that reduces
confusion and that is safe for the patient who, for instance, may eat houseplants; feed a
person as to prevent choking from aspiration (food entering the airways); develop a
toiletting or changing schedule that prevents dangerous skin breakdown and recognize
breakdown when it occurs; give medication to a perhaps resistant patient; recognize
coexisting illnesses in a non-communicative person; or adapt their own behavior as to
prevent catastrophic reaction. This list covers only a very few of the skills the care giver
must learn; a care giver with these skills is no longer an untrained lay person and should be
able to be reimbursed. Additionally, much of the care is medically necessary because the
patient may, for instance, not eat without being fed and thus starve to death.
Obviously, for legal and practical purposes it is a gray area whether care is skilled
or custodial. For insurance carriers, skilled care is traditional medical care such as nursing
services provided by licensed staff: physical, occupational or speech therapy, drug therapy,
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etc. And the few skilled nursing facilities certified by Medicare are closer to acute care
hospitals than they are to traditional nursing homes. They are closer to the traditional
curative treatment model of the hospital than they are to the care model of nursing homes.
However, with a growing aging population and consequent increased prevalence of
dementia, perhaps these concepts need to be reevaluated. For instance, is a shot more
treatment than a comforting hug, is intravenous feeding more nourishing than careful
feeding or prompting to self-feed, and is a catheter better treatment than regular toiletting
or changing?
The skilled nursing principles that were previously discussed also apply to Home
Health Care. The issues are similar, but care is provided in a private home rather than in a
nursing home. Medicare may pay for some physician prescribed services such as pai1-time
skilled nursing, physical and speech therapy, and home health aides. However, the service
must be related to a covered illness, and dementias arc usually not a covered illnesses. The
director of a home health agency stated that Medicare or private insurance will pay when
it is demonstrated that skilled care is provided mainly by a nurse or under a nurse's
supervision. She said "things like wound care and injections are paid; prevention like with
Alzheimer's disease families is not allowed or encouraged" (personal communication, July
1995). With very careful documentation, the home health care agency may be able to
provide some initial education for families, but reteaching when the condition progresses
into another stage is not reimbursable. "In essence," she said "Chronic conditions are not
fixable, improvement is the key -- constantly show improvement. Have a start and an
end."
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Hospice Care
There is a clear end to dementia, death. Yet, whether Hospice Care is reimbursed
by Medicare or not is unclear and decided on an individual basis. Physical, terminal
illnesses are covered once the physician certifies that the patient has only a very limited life
expectancy (according to the HCFA representative about six months). Because many late
stage dementia patients are in nursing homes, hospice care is not often considered as an
option for the family. And since pain relief, symptom management, and supportive services
to terminally ill patients are the key components for reimbursement by Medicare, and a
strict medical model is usually applied, it appears that reimbursement for dementia patients
and their families may be doubtfol.
It appears that the "benevolent legislative purpose" of congress with the
f

f

introduction of Medicare (Kuebler F. Secreta,y <! Oepart111e111 <! Health and /-/11111011
Services)

has made room for a cold, rational bureaucratic approach as teared by Weber

(Farganis, 1993). While some litigation seems to question Medicare practices, as a whole
dementia patients are usually not reimbursed for hospital, nursing home, home health, or
hospice care because their illness is considered either a condition requiring only
"custodial" care, whatever that may be, or a mental illness for which care is only
reimbursable on a very limited basis. However, should dementia ever be classified as the
bona fide physical illness it appears to be, reimbursement through Medicare may become
easter.
Medicare - Part B - Outpatient Care and Beyond
While the dementia patient in need of institutional or other extended care fares
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badly under Medicare Plan A, Medicare Part B that covers outpatient treatment is a little
friendlier to those patients, at least in the beginning. Table 5 will show what is covered
under this plan which is based on premium contributions from beneficiaries.
Table 5 - Medicare Part B· 1995
Services
MEDICAL EXPENSES
Doctor's services, inpatient and outpatient medical and
surgical services and supplies, physical and speech therapy,
diagnostic tests, durable medical equipment and otJ1er
services.
CLINICAL LABORATORY SERVICES
Blood tests, urinalyses, and more.
HOME HEALTH CARE
Part-time or intermittent skilled care, home health aide
services, durable medical equipment and supplies and other
services.

Benefit
Unlimited if medically
necessary.

Medicare Pays
80% of approved amount
(aller $ I 00 deductible).
Reduced to 50% for most
outpatient mental health
services.

Unlimited if medically
necessmy.
Unlimited as long as
patient meets Medicm·e
conditions.

Generally 100% of
approved amount.
I 00% of approved
amount; 80% of approved
amount for durable
medical equipment.

Unlimited if medically
20% of billed amount
OUTPATIENT I-IOSPlTAL TREATMENT
necessmy.
(allcr $ I 00 deductible).
Services for the Jiagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.
Adapted from: Your Medicare I [andbook, I 995. Department ol Health and Human Se1v1ces

Based on the strict traditional medical interpretation of health care, Medicare Part
B may pay l'or doctor visits, diagnostic tests, and treatment of physical illncs�c� a� Medical
Expenses. However, it "will not pay for most routine physical examinations, and tests
directly related to such examinations" (Department of Health and Human Services, l 995,
p. 14), and according to the HCFA representative, after the initial diagnosis most care for
dementia patients is considered routine. As previously discussed, such routine
examinations may discover coexisting physical illnesses in dementia patients who can no
longer communicate their symptoms in an appropriate manner. Consequently, patients may
not be diagnosed for a currently bona fide physical illness and not receive treatment or
extended care that may be reimbursable under the skilled care criteria.
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Furthermore, it is noteworthy that once dementia is diagnosed as a mental illness
and treated by a mental health professional such as a psychiatrist, reimbursement is heavily
reduced.
Many general practitioners refer dementia patients to psychiatrists. The psychiatrist
usually diagnoses and prescribes medications for dementia patients. The psychotherapy
and counseling that can be provided by some psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical
social workers, and that is partially reimbursable by Medicare, is usually not an option for
dementia patients because of their cognitive impairment. However, care givers may greatly
benefit from it, but only direct care to the patient is reimbursable. Because of low
reimbursement rates, many psychiatrists will not provide care to dementia patients that
may benefit from their treatment and that may help families to prevent institutionalization.
A worker in a community medical center found it to be her experience that general
practitioners may delay the diagnosis of dementia, even if they arc fairly sure, to protect
the patient. They also can refor to a neurologist, who is not considered a mental health
professional, and thus reimbursement criteria changes. The care and testing provided by a
neurologist may be very appropriate and helpful for the patient. An insurance
representative stated that Blue Shield, whose payment policies are similar to those of
Medicare, pays for dementia followed by neuromedicine but not followed by psychiatry
(personal communication, August 1995). A interviewed physician, who usually refers
those patients who can pay to a neurologist for testing and treatment, noted that those
patients who cannot be referred because they lack the financial means otlen require a "very
long" time until all other illnesses are ruled out and a diagnosis of dementia must be made
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(personal communication, October 1995). So treatment and support is provided on an
acute not routine basis. Although this sounds like compassion, Hirsh (1990) points out
that physicians may be subject to litigation if they misdiagnose dementia that m ay
stigmatize the patient and prevents him or her from obtaining more appropriate tr;atment.
Outpatient care is similar to reimbursement for medical expenses with the reduced
reimbursement of 50% for mental illnesses. Reimbursement criteria for Home Health Care
is the same under Part A and Part B and has been discussed previously.
To summarize Medicare reimbursement for dementia patients: It is usually not
covered when it exceeds the most basic level and a very limited time frame. Perhaps the
private insurance representative captured Medicare's difficulties with dementia when he
said, "The problem with dementia is that accurate diagnosis is still difficult, and dementia
is not tangible. Dementia and mental illness is still vague and not concrete" (personal
communication, August 1995). So how is dementia treatment and care paid for if private
fonds are not available or exhausted?
Medicaid - Medical Charity
For those who have exhausted their Medicare coverage, are ineligible or are
otherwise indigent, Medicaid eligibility may be determined. As previously discussed,
Medicaid is jointly financed by federal and state governments to pay health care, including
long-term care, for the poorest segment of the American population. Medicaid is not
based on the shared risk principle of insurance like Medicare is; it is in essence government
charity (or welfare) for those who cannot provide for themselves. Consequently, public
policy and assistance will not start until a person is reduced to a certain level of poverty.
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However, once a person is Medicaid eligible, most medical financial worries should end.
Medicaid pays for "medical care and services through direct payments to suppliers of the
care and services," including premiums for Medicare Part B and long term care in nursing
homes (Social Security Bulletin, 1987). According to a report by National Public Radio
(NPR) on October 25, 1995, currently 4 million senior citizens have health care through
Medicaid, and the nursing home cost is paid by this program for 1.6 million elderly
persons.
This relatively comprehensive paid health care, including dementia care, through
impoverishment of senior citizens has become such a "popular" option that legal
professionals dealing with estate planning advise their clients in planned impoverishment.
Bagge ( 1990), writes:
An older person or couple attempting to plan for an uncertain future is challenged
by the need to navigate between ... adequate health care whose cost can pauperize
the all1uent and ... premature estate distribution, a self..pauperization which may
lead to a loss of autonomy and unexpected denial of public funding for required
health care. ( 46)
Nevertheless, many attorneys advise their clients to pauperize themselves in a
planned manner, and the legal literature offers a surprisingly large number of articles on
that topic ( e.g., Bonnyman, 1990; Buddish, 1990; Gouskos, 1989; Mooney et al. 1988;
Simon, 1984). A Legal Aid representative stated that they make all of their clients
routinely aware of this option, who then must seek assistance from a private attorney
(personal communication, September 1995).
It takes an attorney's services to understand the eligibility criteria. Because
Medicaid is in its basic elements a state's program supplemented by federal funds, each
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state determines its own eligibility criteria and also which services will be covered.
Presently, some minimum federal regulations must be adhered to, but proposed welfare
reforms would eliminate these requirements. States would receive block-grants from the
federal government for disposal at their own discretion and within their own regulations.
Most persons need Medicaid funds only for either long-term care at home or for
nursing home care. In general, to be eligible for nursing home reimbursement, they must
spend down all personal property which usually does not take long once a person enters a
nursing home. Nursing home costs range from $20.000 to $50.000 annually, with
Medicaid paying a per-diem rate of 62.22/day in Virginia and a slightly higher rate for
special care unit placement. (Private pay rate is substantially higher at $88.00 per day for
room and board and extra charges for many other services in a medium priced nursing
home.) Aboul half of those entering nursing facilities in Virginia qualify for Medicaid six
months later (Virginia Department for the Aging, 1991 ). The admission dircclor of a
nursing home (personal communication, August 1995) usually admits as private pay those
patients who have a minimum of $20,000.00 available. All others must attempt to become
Medicaid eligible. Nursing homes otlen will not admit thoi;e who do not have adequate
cash but are not poor enough tu be Medicaid eligible.
Buddish ( l 990) summarized the general rules that apply in most states as follows:
non-married persons can keep a personal allowance once they enler the nursing home
ranging from $30.00 - 70.00 per month ($40.00 in Virginia). ln some states, they may also
keep funds for health insurance premiums and other medical expenses not covered by
Medicaid. To maintain a home, persons are allowed a small allowance averaging $250.00
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per month which ceases when they enter the nursing home permanently.
Assets the person can protect include for a limited time the house they live in,
household goods not to exceed a value of $2,000.00, one wedding and one engagement
ring, one car of a value not to exceed $4,500.00, personal property if the property is
income or sustenance producing, cash value of a life insurance not to exceed $1,500.00,
and up to $1,500.00 for burial costs.
Federal safeguards implemented in September 1989 protect married community
spouses against being impoverished. A spouse may keep his or her income, plus a basic
living allowance from the nursing home resident's income, capped at about $1,500.00 per
month. The spouse of a nursing home resident also may keep certain assets, including
$62,000 of their combined life savings, and exempted assets similar to those of single
persons, including the home as long as the community-based spouse lives in that home.
Exempted assets can be protected without limitation on their value. However, current
proposed welfare refr,rm would remove that safeguard for married spouses from lecleral
regulation; states would have to come up with their own criteria to protect community
spouses from impoverishment. The interviewed Legal Aid representative stated that it
must be noted that the nursing home spouse is essentially homeless once he or she
becomes eligible for Medicaid, and the community spouse will become homeless once he
or she moves out of the home for whatever reason (personal communication, September
1995).
The states protected themselves somewhat against planned impoverishment for
Medicaid through transfer of assets. "Transfers of property for less than fair market value
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made within thirty months [italics in original] of an older person's application for Medicaid
generally are not considered valid for transfers for Medicaid purposes" (Buddish, 1990, p
53). Certain exceptions apply to those transfer rules. The reimbursement officer in the

geropsychiatric facility sometimes advises spouses to buy that car they always wanted so
their institutionalized spouse will become Medicaid eligible (personal communication,
August 1995).
Once Medicaid eligibility is determined for a person, comprehensive home health
care is reimbursable under Medicaid in many states for those persons who are also nursing
home eligible (Fatoullah,1992; Estes and Swan, 1993). Here too, eligibility criteria and
services vary widely by state, and legal advise may be needed. In Virginia, once a person is
nursing home eligible, Medicaid pays usually for personal care, adult day care, and respite
care as long as the cost of home care is less than that of nursing home care. /\II services
must be provided by authorized agencies; a family care giver cannot be reimbursed. Some
Social Service Departments have a very small fund they can use to pay informal care
givers for personal care once the patient's nursing home eligibility is determined. ln most
cases, the payment for home suppo1i services, if they can find them, is the patients' or the
families' responsibility (Virginia Department for the Aging, 1991).
Medicare, Medicaid, and most private insurance will not pay for adult home care.
However, some coverage may be supplied through the Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program that is available to the very poorest segment of our population under
certain circumstances. In Virginia, an auxiliary grant can help indigent persons to pay for
adult home care. After they have depleted all of their assets and income, the grant pays
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between $600.00 - $700.00 per month. A monthly allowance of $35.00 is granted to pay
for personal items, including co-payment for drugs that are not covered by Medicaid
(Virginia Department for the Aging, 1991).
Barriers to Care For Dementia Patients
While it appears that for most options (excluding home care by informal care
givers) either Medicare, private insurance, Medicaid or other welfare programs will help
to pay, the matter is much more complicated in reality. All have very complicated
eligibility criteria, and many providers of services will not accept these payment sources as
reimbursement in full. It is estimated that elders pay more than 18% of their health cost
which may constitute 4.5 months of their annual Social Security income. Older women
seem to be worse off with Medicare covering only 33% of health care costs for single
older women living alone (Estes and Swan, 1993).
Additionally, many residential long-term care facilities, home health agencies, and
similar providers will only serve private pay patients. Many respite and day care programs
will not accept patients with difficult behaviors or advanced firnctional impairments such
as incontinence, so they may have to search for more expensive alternatives. The
availability of services is market based, and those who can pay for it have the best access
to it. Many cannot pay the market price of community care, thus they will become
institutionalized. Estes and Swan ( 1993) coined the lack of access to care the no-care
zone. The business director of a nursing home pointed out that a reimbursement system
that encourages welfare usually elicits two responses. Her personal experience shows that
"when the family finds out that nursing home or adult home can be reimbursed, they'll
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institutionalize" (personal communication, September 1995). The facility is not Medicare
certified, and thus only admits private pay or Medicaid patients. The second response is
that of families fiercely proud of the fact that they are able to provide for themselves,
voicing that mom or dad would have wanted it this way. Mom or dad can still pay their
own way. Generally, she finds that "people get upset because they tried to build up some
wealth and now they lose it all; they have the same like those who didn't save anything
during their younger years." Perhaps the current strong public support for welfare reform
reflects that sentiment.
Furthermore, legislation discourages community mental health clinics to serve the
elderly as previously discussed. In fact, in Virginia, CSBs have a financial incentive not to
commit their clients to state psychiatric hospitals. However, this financial incentive is not
available for diversion of geriatric clients, thus, hospitalization in a state facility is
indirectly encouraged, even though we know that co1rnnunity care is rnore desirable and
possible.
Dementia patients, who are usually not considered medically ill under current
reimbursement standards, will be reduced to poverty and welfare before they can receive
some of the care they need or when family members are not willing or able to provide
unpaid home care. This care may include involuntary commitment into a public psychiatric
hospital; private hospitals utilize the involuntary commitment process less often. Informal
care givers often must provide unpaid care and make tremendous personal sacrifices either
out of economic necessity or compassion. What went wrong with social policy in
America? Two sociological concepts may provide some answers: Function and
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dysfunction as described by Merton ( 1964) and bureaucracy as described by Weber
(translated and re-published, 1978).
Function and Dysfunction of Social Policy
It was the purpose of the Social Security Act and consequent introduction of
Medicare to assist senior citizens that have made a considerable contribution to the wealth
and well-being of America. As a group, those age 65 and over were the first to have
national health insurance. No other subgroup of the American population has public health
insurance to this date. The purpose of the Medicaid component that protects older persons
was to provide a safety net for those who were not Medicare eligible or when Medicare
did not cover necessary medical services. Obviously, that social policy fulfilled a function
for the older population. It provided health insurance for medical care usually more
needed by older persons than by a younger population, because older persons always had
more illnesses than younger persons, and they may no longer have any health insurance
provided by their employers during their working years. The system was based on a
pooled risk. Medicaid fulfilled the same function on a smaller basis, except the risk was
with the government. Persons could age in dignity and peace and their children, mainly the
males in the family, could take their place being the productive members of society.
Additionally, they did not need to provide a substantial amount of money to assist their
parents to pay medical bills. Many women provided unpaid care for the children and the
elderly who needed assistance in the family.
However, Medicare has not change considerably since its implementation in 1965.
These last 30 years have brought considerable changes to America. The birthrates and
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increased life expectancies produced an ever-increasing older population while medical
costs experienced more inflation than any other commodity in America. At the same time,
more women--the traditional unpaid care givers--entered the workforce for a variety of
reasons, but often for economic ones. It is difficult to expect from women who were not
able to stay at home to raise their own children, to make the sacrifice of giving up an often
hard earned career to care for their aging family members. The cries of crisis that we hear
today result from a failure to adapt Medicare to changing economic and social conditions.
The original Medicare concept had survived even though it was no longer fulfilling the
needs for the elderly, thus it became partially dysfunctional.
The changing conditions also changed the original intent of Medicaid. Medicaid
was meant as a last resource, a final safeguard, but it became the primary resource for
health care for many elderly persons, especially for those with chronic illnesses such as the
dementias. Lt too had survived but became dyslunctional tor the original population.
Furthermore, a lack of adaptation to the changing family that is 110 longer routinely
available to provide care to older family members increased institutionalization of elders
who lost the ability to live independently. The whole system had become dysfimctional for
those it was originally intended for, primarily the elderly and secondarily their families.
However, Merton realizes that concepts or systems become often functional for
another population when they become dysfunctional for the original one. And this did
happen precisely with Medicare and Medicaid. Whole industries have developed around
these systems. With public geropsychiatric hospitals perhaps declining, private hospitals
open geropsychiatric units on an ever expanding basis. Medicare will pay a substantial
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amount for 190 days which can be lucrative business. Nursing and boarding homes, adult
day care programs, and home health care agencies spring up everywhere, even though
their lobbyists complain loudly about inadequate reimbursement, which allows many of the
facilities to also offer inadequate services to ensure profits. The graying of America is
good business for health care and long-term care industries, and social policy provides
much of the funding, thus social policy has become functional for that industry.
Function and Dysfunction of Classification
The concept of function and dysfunction can also be applied to the classification of
dementia. Dementia occurring in old age, at the prevalence level we have today and
anticipate in the future, is a relatively new phenomenon beginning in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. With increasing life expectancies, we did see more and more old
people displaying the behavioral symptoms of dementia, and they also showed the physical
decline associated with old age. Two concepts were available to explain such problems:
mental illness that required "managing" and old age that required supervision and help
with everyday tasks. Both classifications also had people and locations to manage and
supervise those elders: the mental health profession with its various in- and outpatient
clinics, and the home where women provided unpaid care. Thus, the classifications fulfilled
the functions to a) place the dementia sufferers in some location from the poorhouse to the
mental hospital or the care of family, and b) give those around them the peace of mind that
they provided the most "appropriate" care and management for the elderly who became
"senile," thus relieving our collective responsibility. After all, our Judeo-Christian heritage
tells us that we must honor and provide for our elders (Post, 1990); the classification
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provided a convenient tool to shift this responsibility from the collectivity of society to
selected groups.
However, the physical sciences developed better methods to view the human body,
including the brain, and tests were developed to search for biological causes for illnesses,
including dementia. Such research showed that many illnesses, including dementia, were
not an illness of the mind but of the body. Yet the classifications survived. But the
classification no longer served primarily to provide appropriate care and placement in
location. So neither the patients nor society benefitted any longer, especially as the
provision of care put an ever increasing fiscal burden on Americans. Yet, the classification
is still alive and well; as one physician stated, "You need to take that up with the AP A"
(American Psychiatric Association). While this may be a hopeless undertaking, he may be
right.
The Function for Psychi:1try

Psychiatry has since its beginning struggled for full recognition as a medical
science and constantly had to restructure its cultural jurisdiction. As an outgrowth of the
prestigious discipline of neurology, psychiatry has a history from being the keepers of the
asylums, over the psychoanalytical school of thought with "talk-therapy," to its present
pharmacological model. Abbott (1988) gives an excellent history of the changing cultural
jurisdictions of psychiatry and the invasion of other professions, such as psychology, social
work, and counseling, into the arena of psychiatry. With a renewed focus on biological
triggers for mental illnesses, and personal problems well under the control of mental health
professions other than psychiatry, psychiatrists are compelled to include illnesses into their
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jurisdiction that could just as well be served by neurology. Romano (1994) is only partly
right when he laments, "We [psychiatrists] have lost the demented patients and others with
organic brain disease to the neurologists because of our negligent attention to biological
matters" (89). Dementia is firmly included as a mental illness and in the jurisdiction of
psychiatry, and thus serves the function to further strengthen the role of psychiatry,
especially as the population ages and prevalence of dementia increases. While the
pharmacological advances have brought great relief to patients with certain mental
illnesses, and some dementia patients definitely benefit from treatment by psychiatry, such
treatment can have devastating economic and social consequences for the patients, as
previously discussed. Thus, the classification is mostly dysfunctional for the dementia
patient. The controversy over the entire concept of mental illness has been discussed in
chapter three.
The [◄ unction for Society

The American society as a whole was another beneficiary of the classification
system, regardless whether dementia is seen as a mental illness or simply as a
deterioration. As previously mentioned, care of the dementia patient has been delegated to
a variety ofjurisdictions because once we accept either classification, it only confirms our
history that such patients must be kept safe. We then can argue that this safe-keeping is
best carried out in specially designed facilities. Thus, the ever increasing number of
facilities and consequent need to fill those facilities shows how caring we are, while at the
same time making true the nightmare of many older persons, including dementia patients,
that of being put into a "home." Accepting dementia as a collective public health issue
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perhaps would force us to fund research, treatment, and care accordingly. Even though
Moody (1992) maintains that "in the last decade Alzheimer's disease has moved, in the
famous phrase of sociologist C. Wright Mills, from a private sorrow to being understood
as a public problem" (98), we are still not willing to expand the public funds necessary to
provide the level of care needed to maintain hope and dignity for patients and families;
other issues are still more pressing. Although $280 million was spent in 1992 for
Alzheimer's disease research, four to seven times more funds were spent on research for
heart disease' cancer and AIDS (Alzheimer's Disease and Related disorders Association'
1992).
However, more and more families feel the effects of the aging population and the
effects of dementia. Nearly every interviewed person immediately shared a personal
experience, either in their family or in the family of friends where the present systems did
not meet the needs of those involved. While the classification i::; dysrunctional for the
elderly dementia patients and often for their families at the present time, it is still functional
for our social conscious if we are not directly affected. However, classification and
resulting social policies may become dysfunctional for society as a whole as more and
more families feel the effects of the graying of America.
The Bureaucracy of Social Policy
Social policies are administered in the framework of bureaucracies. Max Weber
(1964, 1978 translated versions) describes bureaucracies as having certain characteristics
and principles. The principles include that of "o.f/7cialj11risdictio11al areas, which are
generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations" (956).
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Classification provides an ideal tool to separate the jurisdictional areas and allows for laws
to be applied according to jurisdiction. Once the jurisdiction is established "only persons
that qualify ... are employed" (956). This allows jurisdictions, based on classifications, to
stay intact and protected, as is exemplified by the classification of dementia as a mental
illness. Weber sees this development of systematically patterned bureaucracies as a
phenomenon of the modern state. One must agree when we consider that, in the not too
long ago past, the extended family took care of their elders, perhaps assisted by a local
physician, the church congregation, and the community. Only after these informal means
to care for individual elders became less available was the bureaucratic system feasible and
needed, resulting in the Social Security Act.
This writer agrees with Weber that there may be no alternative to the bureaucratic
structure to administer large scale programs and services to a large segment of the
population in a modern society. Ritzer ( 1992) in quoting Weber writes, "The needs of
mass administration make it [bureaucratic structure] today completely indispensable. The
choice is only between bureaucracy and dilettantism in the field of administration" ( l 3 I).
The individualized services provided by families or communities are no longer available
without any assistance; it is the large scale provision of services that requires the structure
bureaucracy has to offer. And even if we could return to these individual services, they
would require some regulation as to avoid misuse and abuse. Would we begin to pay
families a salary to take care of elderly family members, the administration of this pay
would require a structure, as would the provision of services a family cannot provide.
Developments in science and technology have made it impossible for the previous family
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structure to provide what is available and needed, obviously a development of modern
society.
Although bureaucracy seems to be the best alternative we have, not all is well with
it. As predicted by Weber--with amazing vision--the rule-boundedness of such a structure
facilitates that professions and field workers can rationalize their decisions. Usually, they
do what they are supposed to do and can do within the goals and missions of their
individual systems. The systems themselves and those who administer them often have
become system-serving, thus functional for themselves, not client-serving, and therefore
dysfunctional for those they are supposed to serve. Even if a worker clearly sees the needs
of a client, he or she cannot provide the services because rules and regulations prevent it.
On one hand, this prevents arbitrarily administered services based on the subjective
opinion of a worker; on the other hand, it leads to the dissatisfaction of the clientele and
non-availability of services for those who need them. The public is usually blaming the
bureaucrats for the shortcomings of the system, but it is the structure that promotes the
worker to become a cold and calculating rationalizing actor. As previously discussed,
Holstein ( 1993) offers the Weberian concept of "formal rationality;" that is, systems act
according to principles and rules based on institutionalized procedures and, therefore,
promote the predictability of bureaucracies. The administration of other programs,
requiring reliance on expert authority, also reduces the importance of nonrational factors
such as emotions and caring for others. "Abstract laws and formal procedures, it appears,
may eliminate some forms of arbitrariness, but in exchange they introduce an impersonal
monopoly over how compassion, concern, and control are asserted into people's lives"
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(Holstein, 1993, p. 184).
To summarize, in I 965 the Social Security Act was amended to provide medical
insurance for the elderly based on private insurance principles; that is, the insured
contribute through premiums, and benefits paid are an earned right not a charity.
However, Medicare is paying only basic benefits for covered illnesses under limited
circumstances. Illnesses that require custodial care are usually not covered; they are for all
practical purposes a non-illness. What constitutes custodial or skilled care has not been
answered completely, but at this point, dementia care is considered custodial for Medicare
purposes, and thus excluded from payment. Therefore, elderly dementia patients must
reach poverty level before the second safety net that was meant for extreme hardship cases
only, Medicaid the medical welfare program, will pay for treatment and care. Medicare
and Medicaid will not pay Jor care by non-approved providers which includes family
members that ollen care for the dementia victim at home. As a consequence, family
members ofl:en decide to institutionalize the patients because the financial and emotional
hardships become too much for them to bear. Thus, it is concluded that the social policies
intended to help secure adequate health care for the later years have become dystunctional
for the elderly, but have become functional for the long-term care industries and some
professions, mainly psychiatry. Additionally, the bureaucratic systems that administer
social policies also have become system-serving rather than client-serving. They, too, have
become dysfunctional for the original population but now fulfil a function for themselves.
However, it is not unavoidable that we move into the "iron cage" of bureaucratic
rationalization leading to the "polar night of icy darkness" predicted by Weber (Farganis,
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1993). Humans are thinking creatures that can use the best of a system, discard the worst,
and make a better system. The next chapter will present some alternatives to dementia
care that have been explored.
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Chapter 6 - Some Alternatives

In an ideal situation, as a society we would accept that some people need help for
a variety of reasons. We would pool our resources and provide whatever is needed,
regardless of what created the needs. This would require a more equal distribution of the
national wealth, and classifications and categorizations would become obsolete. However,
we do not exist in an ideal world, jurisdictions are established, and interests of groups are
fiercely protected by, among other things, classifications and categorizations.
In this final chapter, some alternatives to the current dilemma of providing care for
elderly dementia patients will be offered for the reader's consideration. Rationing of health
care, solutions implemented in European countries, and case management to coordinate
fragmented systems will be discussed.
Rationing of Health Care

The elderly dementia patients belong to the category of senior citizens by age and
are classified either as chronically or mentally ill or simply as senile due to their condition.
At the same time, Americans maintain that only limited resources are available for those
that need help. One proposed solution is the rationing of health care for the elderly.
As Binstock & Post (1991) argue, the public perceives the underlying thinking of
Social Security and consequent health care for those over age 65 in the form of Medicare
as favoritism toward one categ01y. They are "exempted from the screening that are
applied to other Americans to determine whether they are worthy of public help (I)"
Highly publicized reports promoted the idea that greedy older people take a
disproportionate amount of public fonds and get away with it because they are actually a
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politically powerful force based on their sheer numbers and on their relative wealth. As
one Social Services Department Director put it, the elderly are too greedy to spend their
own money on their own health care; they are politically powerful so they get all the
money, and little is left for the children who are our future.
It is true that social policies have reduced poverty levels for older persons and that
many older people are not poor. But the elderly, just like any other group, are a
heterogeneous group with some being rich and others being poor. However, the elderly
have a greater risk of becoming poor due to medical expenses not covered by any program
and their increased risk for acute and chronic illness, especially dementia that is not or only
very limited covered under Medicare. Additionally, many seem to overlook that the
cornerstones of social policy for the elderly, Social Security and Medicare, are based on
contributions and are administered under the same principles as private insurance. Of
course, some aging programs are charity with the Medicaid component for the elderly
taking up the largest part. lronically, it is the lack of comprehensive coverage for
dementias and other chronic illnesses under Medicare and other social programs that ofl:en
reduce the elderly to becoming Medicaid recipients.
Nevertheless, many have a general picture of our aging population as being less
needy than other groups that also want public funds. Thus, the elderly are removed from
the "worthy" needy category. Related to health care, such sentiment has effectively shifted
the blame for the excess public funds spent on it from "providers, suppliers,
administrators, and insurers -- the parties responsible for setting the prices of care -- to the
elderly patients for whom health care is provided" (4) and avoids that distribution of
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resources is evaluated from the angle ofjustice between rich and poor (Binstock & Post,
1991). As a solution, some propose rationing of health care based on age. The biomedical
ethicist, Daniel Callahan, and the former Colorado governor, Lamm, are famous
representatives of this movement, with the latter going so far as stating that older persons
"have a duty to die and get out of the way" (Slater, 1984, quoted in Binstock & Post,
1991, p. 5).
Actually, the proponents of age-based health care rationing are perhaps not only
the more radical but also the more honest segment of our population. Current social policy
already constitutes rationing of health care for elderly persons who are not wealthy
enough to make the co-payments or pay for non-covered elements such as medications.
Health care is severely rationed for dementia patients because their health care is often
considered custodial care that does not fit the focus on "cure" in our current system.
Furthermore, the passive euthanasia that is practiced by ignoring the co-occurri11g illnesses
of dementia patients is a radical form of rationing. Whether a health care professional
administers the death-bringing treatment or withholds the diagnosis and treatment that can
save or prolong a life is irrelevant for the outcome; it only slightly changes the time when
the outcome, death, occurs. Battin (1992) argues that withholding treatment is seldom
termed "euthanasia" and is permitted by social policy, while the active form is prohibited.
However, instead of entering the "slippery road," as termed by Battin, of social policy
permitting active euthanasia for dementia patients in advanced stages, we otlen elect the
more subtle forms of withholding health care for dementia patients. They are classified as
needing "custodial care" only which leaves them in the care of care givers who may not be
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able to recognize co-occurring illnesses. Furthermore, by withholding Medicare payment
for routine doctor visits, it can be rationalized that if we do not know, necessary health
care cannot be provided.
When solutions to social problems are contemplated, "worthiness" often becomes
an issue. Sudnow ( 1967) explored how worthiness of receiving health care was
subjectively decided by ambulance drivers. Others (Kamerman, 1988; Moody, 1992;
Smith, 1992) explore the issue whether dementia patients still experience personhood or
identity. This sentiment was expressed by one of the interviewed physicians who believes
that "dementia is infancy in reverse." According to this view, newborn babies gain
recognition of their loved ones and appreciation of their surroundings as they get older;
dementia patients lose that recognition and appreciation. As infants gain abilities to eat
independently, toilet, and groom, dementia patients lose such abilities (personal
communication, September 1995). ln short, babies progress into personhoocl and develop
an identity, while dementia patients regress into non-personhood and lose their identity.
Perhaps it is this sentiment that justifies that very large amounts of health care fi.mds are
expanded to save infants at risk but prevent the development of social policy to care for
dementia patients in the best possible manner. The infant gains recognition, the demented
patient has lost recognition and will never gain it, so why spend money on a "hopeless"
cause when custodial care will do?
Obviously, the issue of health care rationing spawned many debates, and many
different opinions have been heard and will be heard. However, whether society will
ultimately decide for or against provision of appropriate care and funding for the elderly,
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including elderly dementia patients, is heavily influenced by our values as a society.
The European Alternative
Many European countries have comprehensive health insurance and long-term care
insurance for their elderly. The Netherlands have since 1968 mandatory contribution-based
long-term care insurance for the chronically ill, regardless of classification or age, in
addition to comprehensive national health insurance. Denmark and Sweden provide
comprehensive care for the chronically ill from tax revenues. Austria implemented in 1993
a system that provides a safety-net for chronically ill persons before they become welfare
eligible. Thus, persons must spend down to pay for long-term care but not to the poverty
level. France and Belgium pay for treatment with public funds but require the patients to
pay for their own room and board. This cost can be paid from public funds for the
indigent. Germany, a country with a longstanding history of comprehensive social
programs, did not have long-term care insurance prior to 1995. The "pillars" of the social
security system were implemented beginning in 1883 with health insurance, followed by
occupational accident insurance in 1884, social security in 1889, and unemployment
insurance in 1927. All programs are contribution-based, with employers and employees
contributing about half of the cost each, and fee waivers for those who are unemployed or
ill. Only the very wealthy are exempted from contribution but also from receiving. Health
insurance is comprehensive for all age groups with only minimal co-payments for some
assistive devices and medications. However, the cost to provide what Americans may
consider "custodial care" was not covered. Increased longevity forced many Germans that
required long-term care for chronic illnesses to impoverish themselves so they would
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become welfare eligible. In addition, spouses, and at times even adult children, could be
held responsible for long-term care. To correct this situation, as of January 1, 1995,
Germany implemented the fifth pillar, long-term care insurance, as part of and
administered by the health care insurance with the following rationale (translated by the
author of this paper from a brochure published by the German Ministry for Labor and
Social Order [Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung]):
The need to receive care resulted for care recipients and their families in
large physical, psychological, and financial burdens ... the cost was the
responsibility of the patients and their families. But the cost is often so great that it
exceeds the individual's means. Care recipients are dependent on others for
essential activities of daily living ... care givers often must reduce or quit their
employment so they can provide care, but as a consequence reduce or lose their
own social security ['social security' is meant as a comprehensive protection
system, not limited to the American form of income subsidy in old age].
For these reasons, families are less willing to provide care at home and
increasingly institutionalize the person in need of care. However, the care recipient
and the families arc ofl:cn unable to pay the cost of institutionalized care.
Therefore, in the old States [former West ermanyl approximately 80 percent uf
long-term institutionalized persons require welfare (Sozialhille) and in the new
States [former East Germany] I 00 percent require welfare. Sue/, higl, percentages
of we(fare recipients among those in need of long-term care are opposite lo the
principles of our .\ystem of social security.
We(fare should only subsidize in exceptional cases, to alleviate individual
emergencies, when the existing social programs i11 an individual case fail to
provide s1!f/1Cie11t protection and the personal means are not Sl!/Jicient to pay.
Welfare should protect.from individual risk, but it should not be the rule.for those
requiring long-term care in institutional settings [italics added]. So far, the care
recipients become the recipient of an allowance, even if he, in a full lite of
employment, paid contribution and taxes for the building and maintenance of our
social system. Additionally, those legally responsible for the maintenance of the
care recipient can be held liable for the cost.
These processes not only reduce the performance of individual's, they also
endanger acceptance of our economic and social order as a whole. Additionally,
such unintended financing by welfare leads to increased payments from welfare
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which can exceed the means of the carriers of social programs, especially the
localities. (It is noteworthy that the proposed welfare reforms in America will shift
responsibility for such programs to localities.)
Population trends show an increase in life expectancy and in the population
age 75 and over. This age group has an increased risk to become care recipients.
Changes in living conditions (or styles) and family relations lead to smaller families
and single-person households. This development makes home care more difficult.
Therefore, it becomes essential to increase the protection for those that require and
provide care.
Beginning January 1, 1995, all persons employed in Germany, and their employers,
began contribution to this new insurance; on April 1, 1995, payments began for home
care, and on July I, 1996, payment for institutional care will begin. The payment system is
heavily favoring home care by providing payment for family or hired care givers similar to
average salaries paid in Germany and by covering the social benefits of the care giver who
elects to quit employment to provide care at home. All social programs do not
differentiate between mental and physical illnesses even though the classifications do exist,
and now "custodial care" is included in the comprehensive health care coverage, thus
removing for social policy purposes ditforentiation based on classification.
lt is beyond the scope of this project to explore all details of the German program.
It is the purpose of this example to show that other industrialized nations have similar
problems regarding health care for the elderly but seem to be able to find workable
solutions.
Fragmented vs. Comprehensive Systems of Care
As previously discussed, American implementation of social public policies have
been pragmatic and incremental. They seem to address only immediate needs in a reactive
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manner, which must lead to fragmentation. Categorization and classification increase that
fragmentation. Such fragmentation leads to many different jurisdictions which sometimes
results in duplication of services but more often in services becoming unavailable, except
for those who have learned to "work the system." Binstock, Post, and Whitehouse ( 1992)
note that a 1990 report by the Office of Technology Assessment found that "the system is
so fragmented that even when high quality services are sufficiently available, many patients
and families do not know about them and require help in defining their service needs and
in arranging for them to be provided" (3). This confirms the opinion of Commissioner
Bland of the Department for the Aging (personal communication, September 1995) that
many families do not know about the services. The Congressional Research Service
reported in l 988 that over eighty federal and many state and locally funded, as well as
privately operated, programs exist in America l:o serve dementia patients. Out each
program has different service jurisdiction, eligibility criteria, and availability of funds.
Under normal circumstances, most dementia patients, as previously discussed, are not
eligible for the major fonding sources of Medicare and Medicaid (Binstock, Post and
Whitehouse, l 992). Actually, a whole new jurisdiction is developing out of the need to
work the system--the case managers. Browne and McNeely ( l 995) describe geriatric case
management as "creating a partnership between the individual, their family (loved ones)
and the service system." Obviously, this is an attempt to provide comprehensive access to
a fragmented system.
Of course, a comprehensive national health insurance system that is not based on
classification but based on individual needs would be a desirable solution. An interviewed
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physician aptly put it when saying, "I can't understand that a nation that can put man in
space is not able to develop a comprehensive health insurance system for its entire
population (personal communication, September 1995). The current debate over Medicare
and Medicaid can make us believe that we are in an imminent crisis. However, Binstock
and Murray (1992) question the politicians' crisis mentalities when asking,
Is there an economic crisis, current or impending, engendered by health care
expenditures? Advocates of heath care cost containment warn that we cannot
economically sustain increasing health care expenditures. Why not? What are the
inevitable dire consequences that would ensue for our nation (as opposed to
specific health care payers and providers) if health care expenditures continue to
grow? (P 157).
They furthermore quote Eli Ginsberg ( 1990) who writes: "There is nothing inherently bad
about the expenditure of $620 billion on health care services by a $5 trillion economy. Nor
is there any reason a $6 to $7 trillion economy should not spend $ l trillion or even more
for its health care" ( 157). Yet, at least the current lrcnd docs not point toward the solution
of national comprehensive health care or increased spending for health care. And even if
spending would increase, dementia patients still may be leH: either entirely on their own or
receive only limited benefits because of classification. As a first step, if we must adhere to
classifications, dementia could be more appropriately included as a physical illness,
regardless where care is provided. As a second step, we could re-evaluate a public
insurance system that mainly considers "curing" worth paying for and "caring" not worth
the investment. Callahan ( 1992) argues that our current insurance system and entitlement
programs for the elderly are heavily biased toward curative medicine; that we expand
endless funds toward high-technology in medicine to "endlessly patching up individual
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human bodies pulled down by their mortality" (145). As long as we consider caring as
being "unskilled" and as being inferior to curing or rehabilitation, we may not be able to
alleviate the private sorrow of dementia; we may actually add to it by not alleviating the
economic burden on patients and families. Short of preventing or finding a cure for
dementias, a major overhaul of our current health care philosophy is required, including
rethinking the validity of current classification systems. Perhaps this can be a step in the
right direction so it will no longer be true that
The tragedy of old age is not the fact that each of us must grow old and die
but that the process of doing so has been made unnecessarily and at times
excruciatingly painful, humiliating, debilitating and isolating through
insensitivity, ignorance and poverty (Schulz, 1985, pp. 192-193).
Conclusion

Chronic illness in old age, especially dementia, is presenting American society with
the dilemma of how to provide care for this segment of the population. It was the purpose
of the previous discussion to explore the current systems that came about by a co1nµlcx
net of social and historical forces that helped to classity dementia as a mental illness or as
age deterioration but not as the physical illness it appears to be. Alzheimer's disease, the
most prevalent form of dementia, is still perceived as the "peculiar disease of the cerebral
cortex" described by Alois Alzheimer in 1907. As Whitehouse (1992) points out:"... the
use of an eponym, like Alzheimer's, to describe an illness usually reflects inadequate
knowledge about classification" (27). This inadequate knowledge about classification has
tremendous consequences for the victims of the disease and their families. Classification
should not be important enough to deprive those in need of dignity, care, and security. We
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have created classification, so we can change it as a first step to improve the plight of
dementia patients. It is our choice.
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